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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
PARLEY PARKER PRATT STUBBS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20011035-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of rape in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
402, a first degree felony, in the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Beaver County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable J. Philip Eves presiding. This court has jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. May a defendant who passes the jury for cause challenge a trial court's denial 
of his motion to change venue? A trial court's denial of a motion to change venue is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Widdison, 2000 UT App 185, f 41,4 P.3d 100. 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in allowing the prosecution to cross-
examine defendant about prior instances of misconduct under rule 608(b), Utah Rules 
of Evidence? The reviewing court will reverse a trial court's ruling under rule 608(b) only 
if "'it is manifest that the trial court so abused its discretion that there is a likelihood that 
injustice resulted.'" State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 120, % 36, 63 P.3d 72. 
3. Whether evidence was sufficient to justify instructions explaining that the 
victim's lack of consent could be proven by defendant's "enticement"? "The trial court's 
determination of whether the facts . . . give rise to 'enticement' within the meaning of [Utah 
Code Ann.] section 76-5-406(11) [Supp. 2000] presents a legal question" reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Scieszka, 897 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah App. 1995). "However, in 
reviewing this question, we grant the trial court a 'measure of discretion' because of the 
highly fact-dependent nature of the trial court's determination. Id. (citation omitted). 
STATUTES. AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules are attached at Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402 (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406 (Supp. 2000); 
Rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; 
Rules 403 and 608, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 8, 2000, defendant was charged by information with rape, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402 (1999) (Count I), and one count of 
forcible sexual abuse, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404 
(1999) (Count II) (R.6-7). 
Defendant failed to appear for his first scheduled trial (R. 165). Defendant appeared 
at the second scheduled setting, and a jury convicted him of rape and acquitted him of 
forcible sexual abuse (R. 287-88). The trial court sentenced defendant to the statutory five-
to-life prison term (R. 303-05). Defendant timely appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, 
which transferred the case to this court under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (4) (Supp. 2002) (R. 
310-11,317). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Effecting a false aura of trustworthiness by signs and allusions to their 
common religious background, defendant enticed Jennie J., a 17-year-old 
ingenue, to a remote spot and, with brutal force and casual attitude, raped 
her. 
Defendant's enticement 
Late in July 2000, defendant, a 6-foot, 4-inch, 26-year-old man weighing 235 pounds, 
was living in the Super 8 Motel in Beaver, Utah, while working on a concrete pouring project 
(T. 212-13,254-55). On the evening of August 1,2000, Jennie J., a 5-foot, 8-inch, 17-year-
old girl weighing 115 pounds, first encountered defendant as she vacuumed her car at a car 
wash in Beaver (T. 119,302,334).2 She watched defendant first drive around the car wash, 
drive down Main Street, and then return about five minutes later (T. 120). Defendant parked 
his truck on the other side of Jennie's car, rolled down his window and began talking with 
her (T. 256,120). Defendant asked what her name was, where she lived and what her family 
did (T. 120-21). Jennie told defendant her name, but not much else (T. 120). When 
defendant asked how old she was, Jennie told him she was 17 and would be turning 18 in 
1
 The facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are recited in a light 
most favorable to the jury's verdict. See State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, f2, 25 P.3d 985. 
Defendant's and Jennie's description of events leading up to the criminal offense are 
substantially the same; accordingly, the initial portion of the Statement of Facts, 
describing defendant's enticement, is drawn from both their testimonies. Two notable 
differences, however, are defendant's assertion that J.J. told him she was eighteen and 
that it was J.J. who directed him onto the isolated dirt road where the incident occurred 
(T. 268-69, 302). 
2
 The State refers to minor victims and minor witnesses by first name or, where 
context requires, first name and initial. In so doing, the State does not intend to 
encourage this Court to depart from its current practice of identifying minors in court 
decisions by initials only. 
3 
January (T. 121, 302). Defendant asked Jennie about her family and Jennie told him about 
her family farm and that it was for sale (T. 120-21). Defendant then asked whether they 
could do something, like go up to her family farm or go to a movie (T. 121, 257). Jennie 
declined and told defendant "she was washing her car and that she wasn't sure" (T. 257). 
Later that evening, defendant again spied Jennie as she pulled out of a Wendy's and 
he again motioned for her to approach (T. 121-122, 257). During this conversation, 
defendant told Jennie that he was a member of the L.D.S. Church and that he had been 
baptized when he was nine years old (T. 122,259, 303). He also showed her his CTR rin -: 
which he claimed had been given to him by his sister (T. 122, 126, 256, 303-304). Jenn 
understood that the ring stood for "choose the right" and, in fact, had worn one herself 
because it helped her through church (T. 126). 
The following day, defendant was at an ARC station when he saw Jennie pull up in 
her vehicle (T. 122, 259). Defendant got out of his truck, walked over to Jennie, and again 
asked her to go out with him or take him to see her family farm (T. 122-23, 260). Jennie 
replied that she did not know and would have to see (T. 122-123). 
Later that night, defendant noticed Jennie's car parked by the Wendy's (T. 261). As 
Jennie was leaving the Wendy's, defendant pulled up next to her "very hard," blocking her 
exit (T. 124, 261-62). Defendant again asked if she would show him the family farm (T. 
124). Based on defendant's appearance, his being Mormon, and defendant's assertions 
about the significance of his name and his CTR ring, Jennie felt "okay" about defendant and 
agreed to take him to see the family farm (T. 125-26, 262, 303).3 
3
 Parley Parker Pratt (1807-1857), whose name defendant bears, was "[one of the 
most significant L.D.S. missionaries, writers, poets, and thinkers to emerge during the 
4 
Defendant followed Jennie to her house in his truck, where she dropped off her car 
and got into defendant's truck (T. 125-26, 263). As they passed Jennie's grandmother's 
house, defendant told her that he had bought hay from her grandfather and also that his 
brother had borrowed a piece of equipment from him (T. 128,215,264-65). Defendant then 
told Jennie that she need not give him further directions to the farm because he could show 
her where it was on his own (T. 129, 215, 265-266, 306-307). Defendant also told Jennie 
that he knew one of Jennie's aunts was having family problems and that her mother was 
getting a divorce because her dad was a "very physical abusing man" (T. 129,265-66,306). 
When Defendant referred to the divorce, Jennie folded her arms and kept to herself (T. 266-
67). She did not cheer up until they reached the farm, where defendant again talked about 
how he had bought the hay and pointed out where he had loaded it "and so forth" (T. 267). 
Defendant and Jennie did not remain very long at the farm - - "He drove in there[, and 
he turned his truck in a circle and drove back out" (T. 129). As defendant drove away, he 
reached over and grabbed Jennie's hand (T. 130). A moment later, defendant turned onto a 
dirt road (T. 130, 268, 309). Defendant pulled off to the side near some trees and asked 
Jennie if she wanted to go for a walk (T. 131,269,310). Jennie agreed, and as they walked 
defendant described how he had received a scar on his arm, which triggered the topic of 
abuse (T. 133,269,310). Jennie strongly expressed her dislike of physical abuse and "men 
that hit," and asked that defendant promise never to physically abuse her (T. 133). Defendant 
early years of the L.D.S. Restoration. He was a central figure in expounding the doctrines 
of the gospel, and his publications set a standard for future pamphleteers. He was a 
member of the original Quorum of the Twelve Apostles in this dispensation and a leader 
in the migration to the Great Basin." Larry C. Porter, Parley Parker Pratt, in 3 
Encyclopedia of Mormonism (1992). 
5 
testified that Jennie was crying and that he tried to comfort her by holding and hugging her 
and suggesting that she yell out loud because no one could hear her; Jennie clung to him (T. 
269-71, 313, 332; State's Ex. 9, Sergeant Chamber's interview with defendant, at pp. 4-5). 
Defendant asked Jennie if she wanted to be his girlfriend, but she did not answer (T. 
134,270). Jennie was crying when defendant held both her hands and put his arms around 
her stomach (T. 270). They kissed and walked back to the truck (T. 272, 313). 
Upon reaching the truck, defendant received a telephone call from his employer, 
asking if defendant would like to go to a bar and drink. Defendant declined (T. 135,272). 
Defendant asked Jennie, who had walked to the passenger's side of the truck, to join him at 
the front of the vehicle. She did, and they again kissed (T. 135,272-74). 
Jennie's description of defendant's sexual abuse and rape 
As they kissed, defendant lifted Jennie's arms onto his shoulders (T. 135-36). He slid 
Jennie back towards the truck (T. 135-36). Then, with her arms on his shoulders, defendant 
un-did her bra and "lifted [her] shirt and everything up over [her] head . . . "in [just] one 
motion" (T. 135-36). Jennie was scared and began to freeze up as defendant lifted her up 
through the open door and onto the back seat (T. 137). Defendant slid Jennie back to the 
pillow, laid her on the seat, and started kissing and touching her all over, including her 
breasts (T. 137-138). He unbuckled her belt and started to un-do her pants, but she told him, 
"No," and that she wanted to go home (T. 137-38,336). She immediately tried to rebuckle 
her belt and put on her pants, but defendant kept trying to kiss her all over (T. 137-38). They 
were "in the middle of nowhere," with no houses or people anywhere near, and Jennie was 
scared defendant would hurt her (T. 138). She tried to think how she could get home 
"without being dead on the road" (T. 138, 339). She was afraid for her safety and kept 
6 
asking what time it was and telling him she wanted to go home (T. 138-39). Defendant kept 
asking her, "Why," and repeatedly answered, "Never mind" (T. 139). 
When Jennie again told defendant that she needed to go home, he finally yielded and 
allowed Jennie to slide out of the truck (T. 139). She turned from defendant, but as she put 
on her shirt, defendant grabbed her left arm so forcefully that he bruised it (T. 139,336-337). 
Using her arm, defendant turned Jennie around, forcefully pinning both of her arms beneath 
her stomach and bending her forward over the seat while he stood behind (T. 139,141,168-
69). He un-did her pants and pulled them down (T. 139). Somehow, perhaps when she had 
earlier put her shirt on, defendant had un-done his pants (T. 139). Jennie started crying and 
felt pain as defendant thrust his penis into her vagina (T. 140). Because defendant was so 
much bigger than her, Jennie decided not to resist, trying to think only of a smart way to get 
home safely (T. 338). 
Defendant finally pulled his penis from Jennie's vagina, announced that "he was 
done," pulled up his pants, and walked away (T. 140). Jennie felt "stuff running down her 
legs, but didn't know what it was (T. 140). She quickly pulled her pants back up, ran to the 
other side of the truck, and told defendant to take her home (T. 140). Defendant started 
driving "real fast," not paying much attention, while she cried (T. 141). Then he slowed 
down and asked her to show him she was okay (T. 141-42). Afraid of what he might do to 
her, she said she was okay and kissed him (T. 142). Defendant asked her several times if 
she wanted to go get ice cream, but Jennie replied that she had to get home (T. 142-44). 
When defendant finally dropped Jennie off in front of her house, she ran in and locked 
the door (T. 143). She took off her clothes and found semen in her pants. Her vagina was 
bleeding painfully (T. 143). She took a shower and douched (T. 144). Concerned about her 
7 
younger sister, Jennie drove to her grandmother's house to check on her (T. 144). She sat 
with her grandmother for awhile, but was unable to say anything because she was scared and 
did not know what to think or do (T. 144-45). When she came home, she was unable to 
sleep. She was also in pain, but when Tylenol failed to relieve it, she prayed it would go 
away (T. 144). 
The following day, Jennie showered to "clean myself again to try to get everything 
off of me" (T. 145). When asked why she did not tell anyone about the incident, she 
answered, "Because I was scared. I didn't know what to think. I didn't know what I was 
supposed to be doing" (T. 145). Jennie was also unable to tell her mother about the incident, 
and although she was crying, said she was "okay" (T. 199-200). 
In the afternoon, Jennie went to the motel where she was employed (T. 145). Loni 
Laws, a high school friend to whom she "talked []about everything," called. Although she 
cried during the conversation, Jennie insisted she was okay and refused to disclose anything 
to him. But Loni asked about what might have happened the night before and whether she 
needed to see a doctor (T. 146). At that point, Jennie said she had to go and hung up. When 
Loni called right back, Jennie told him what had happened, and he told her to report the 
incident to the police (R. 146). 
During this phone conversation, defendant walked in with a flower and a picture 
frame (T. 146). After completing her conversation with Loni from the laundry room, Jennie 
returned to the front foyer and told defendant that he "better leave" (T. 146). Defendant left 
the items, slamming the door as he left (T. 146-47). Jennie then called her boss and told her 
that she needed some help (T. 147). Jennie tried to call her mother, but could only reach her 
8 
grandmother (T. 147). Joined by her grandmother, Jennie went to the sheriffs office where 
Sergeant John Chambers took her statement (T. 147). 
The Police Investigation 
On August 3 rd, the day after the incident, Sergeant John Chambers interviewed 
defendant at the Beaver County Correctional Facility (T. 210-12, 222). Defendant's story 
of how he met Jennie and their subsequent ride substantially matched Jennie's account (T. 
213-17). According to defendant, after he and Jennie met at the front of the truck, they 
walked to the driver's side and "ma[de] out" (T. 217). Then they climbed into back of the 
truck, where they continued to make out until defendant "decided [he] would probably take 
it a little farther.. .[and [he] started fondling her breasts" (T. 217-18). Defendant removed 
Jennie's bra and shirt (T. 218). Jennie told him that because she had to be home soon they 
should get ready to leave, and he agreed (T. 218-19). He helped Jennie out of the truck, 
while she was still shirtless (T. 219). However, once outside of the truck, defendant pulled 
down her already-unbuckled pants and fondled her vagina for a couple of minutes - - "So I 
finished proceeding, tore down her pants and turned her around and we had sex" (T. 219). 
When they had finished having sex and gotten back into the truck and put on their clothes, 
defendant asked Jennie if she was okay (T. 219-220). Jennie smiled and gave him "a big ole 
kiss" (T. 220). As they reached Jennie's home, defendant asked Jennie if she wanted to go 
get ice cream, but she refused, got out, and went into the house (T. 221). 
Defendant believed that he and Jennie had developed a "love-type thing" (T. 222). 
Defendant stated that as he ueas[ed]" Jennie's pants down, "her hand was right with mine." 
He was adamant that Jennie never said, "No," throughout their encounter and he 
9 
"guarantee[d] she was enjoying herself (T. 225-26). Defendant did not know how she got 
the bruises (T. 227). 
The Trauma of Rape 
By the time Jennie's mother, LeeAnn Carter, met her daughter at Deputy Chamber's 
office, Jennie was hysterical and crying (T. 198,200). After giving her statement to Sergeant 
Chambers, Jennie was examined by Dr. Mitchell Melling (T. 148,177-80, 201). Based on 
his finding a linear tear in the back of the vaginal vault, Dr. Melting concluded that vaginal 
penetration had occurred (T. 181-82). He also found bruises on Jennie's upper right chest 
and left forearm that appeared to be about 24 hours old and which were consistent with 
Jennie's description of the incident (T. 181,183-84). 
While still at the hospital, they encountered defendant (T. 198,201-02). Jennie was 
so scared she started shaking and kept saying, "That's him. That's him. That's who hurt 
me" (T. 202). That night, Jennie was terrified. She kept looking over her shoulder and 
worrying about her little sister (T. 202-03). She screamed out all night long and had to be 
sedated (T. 202-03). Jennie's mother testified that Jennie screamed out every night for the 
next six weeks and occasionally still does (T. 203). Jennie went from being a "happy-go" 
person to a "scared little girl," fearful of being left alone and "scared for her life" (T. 203-
04).4 For a long time, Jennie had a hard time attending church. LeeAnn testified that her 
4
 Ms. Carter described Jennie's anxious condition with two anecdotes. Four days 
after the incident, the family took a trip to Salt Lake City because Jennie said, "No one 
knows me [there]" (T. 204). While at an Albertsons, Jennie attempted to go to the 
bathroom, but was so intimidated by the presence of some teenage boys who were 
looking at her that she was unable to even walk past them (T. 204). Two days later in St. 
George, Jennie encountered some teenage boys in the dressing area of an Old Navy. 
Jennie "literally freaked," so that she and her mother had to immediately leave and then 
stay at an aunt's house for three hours before they could drive home (T. 205-06). In 
10 
daughter became a "very cautious" person who now had to force herself to smile (T. 208). 
Jennie met with Scott Langford, Director of Social Services at Beaver Valley Hospital 
for therapy to help her cope with her anxiety and depression (T. 228-29). Mr. Langford first 
met Jennie in the hospital emergency room after she had been examined by Dr. Melling (T. 
202). According to Mr. Langford, Jennie "was very anxious . . . crying, scared... nervous, 
shaky, all those kinds of things" (T. 230). As part of a biopsychosocial intake to assess her 
personality style and past experiences, Mr. Langford spoke with Jennie's mother, 
grandmother, and school personnel (T. 230-31). He determined that before the event, Jennie 
had been very outgoing, popular, and a good student who dated frequently - - "just a pretty 
typical [teenager]" (T. 232). Mr. Langford first diagnosed Jennie with acute stress disorder, 
but soon after revised it to be posttraumatic stress disorder, under the guidelines of the DSM-
IV (T. 229, 232-33).5 
Dr. Mary Doty, a licensed psychologist at Utah State University with a specialty in 
psychological trauma, testified that posttraumatic stress disorder was a psychiatric and 
psychological disorder, recognized in the psychological community since 1980 in the DSM-
111 (T. 188-89,191). The disorder results from actual or threatened serious injury or death 
related to a traumatic event, i.e., one involving fear, hopelessness, or horror (T. 188-89). 
Additional symptoms include difficulty sleeping and a heightened sense of vigilance (T. 
December, while listening to the radio en route to Cedar City, Jennie and her mother 
heard advertising for a Parley P. Pratt celebration in Parowan, through which they had to 
pass and where defendant had apparently settled. Jennie became sick to her stomach, and 
they had to turn around and go home (T. 206-07). 
5
 "DSM" is the abbreviation for "Diagnostic and Statistical Manual," published by 
the American Psychiatric Association and which is the main diagnostic reference of 
American mental health professionals. 
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190). Rape is considered to be among those traumatic events precipitating the disorder (T. 
191). Social workers with training are qualified to diagnosr the disorder (T. 192). 
Mr. Langford also discussed some of the DSM-IV criteria for diagnosing 
posttraumatic stress disorder: (1) a precipitating event involving a sense of helplessness; (2) 
a re-experiencing of the event, i.e. nightmares, flashbacks; (3) avoidance of persons or places 
related to the event; (4) illogical hyperarousal, i.e., lack of sleep, nervousness, dietary 
change; and (5) clinically significant life change (T. 233-34). Mr. Langford testified that 
Jennie substantially exhibited all of these symptoms, i.e., nightmares, difficulty sleeping, 
inability to relax, fear of social situations, flashbacks, fear of what others thought (T. 235). 
He particularly noted the dramatic changes in Jennie's life. She stopped going to work for 
awhile, considered not attending school, isolated herself from her friends, retreated to her 
house, and stopped dating. These were all significant changes from a formerly good student 
who enjoyed dating (T. 235-36). At one point, Jennie took on two jobs so that she could 
avoid relating to anybody and the possibility of encountering defendant (T. 236). Mr. 
Langford ruled out the divorce of Jennie's parents as a significant factor contributing to 
Jennie's condition, since the divorce had already been on-going for three years at the time 
of her therapy (T. 237). He also carefully considered the possibility that guilty feelings 
resulting from behavior contrary to her moral precepts might have precipitated Jennie's 
condition (T. 237-38). He excluded that possibility, noting that the dramatic change in her 
personality far superceded the depression that frequently follows a shameful act - -"[i]t didn't 
fit her personality... talking to other people involved" (T. 238). On cross-examination, Mr. 
Langford testified that he had never seen an instance, in which mere deviation from a 
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strongly held moral precept could precipitate posttraumatic stress disorder, an observation 
clearly confirmed in the scientific literature (T. 243). 
At the time of trial, Jennie had been in therapy for more than a year following the rape 
(T. 229). 
Defendant's version of the rape 
Defendant testified that after he declined his boss's telephone invitation to go 
drinking, he and Jennie started kissing as he "help[ed] her in the back of the truck," where 
he had a pillow (T. 275, 328). While they were both clothed, defendant fondled Jennie's 
breasts as she played with his penis (T. 275,279). Then Jennie took off her shirt, and after 
removing his own shirt and with her tacit approval, he took off her bra (T. 275-76,280,315-
317, 326). Defendant unbuttoned Jennie's pants and fondled her vagina. He kissed her 
breasts and her belly button (T. 276-77, 280). "She was breathing hard. She's into it" (T. 
277). Jennie unbuttoned defendant's pants (T. 280). At no point did Jennie resist 
defendant's advances or ask him not to proceed (T. 275-78). 
When defendant realized there was not enough room inside the truck to finish 
removing Jennie's pants and have sex with her, he got out and then helped Jennie get down 
(T. 277-78). Once outside the truck, they both pulled down her pants (T. 279). They were 
both "hot and bothered" (T. 280). He reached around her with his left hand and guided his 
penis into her vagina from behind (T. 281,320). Not only did Jennie not protest, but during 
sex she moaned and afterward "she was... "oh-oh," and asked if he was "done already" (T. 
281). Then they put on their clothes, got in the truck, and drove to Jennie's home (T. 182). 
As defendant drove away, he asked Jennie if she still felt okay about being his 
girlfriend (T. 283). Jennie answered that she wasn't sure, but then kissed him and he kissed 
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her back (T. 284). Defendant stated that he did not feel good about having sex with Jennie 
if she was not serious about being his girlfriend because he would "feel used" (T. 283). 
Defendant then asked Jennie if she wanted to go get some ice cream, but she said that she 
needed to be home at 9 o'clock (T. 283). Defendant dropped Jennie off and did not see her 
until the next day at the motel (T. 284-285). He went home, showered, slept "great," and 
woke up happy (T. 323). 
Defendant bought Jennie a rose, a card, and a picture frame and brought it to her at 
the front desk of the motel (T. 285). Then the phone rang and she was on it for a while (T. 
285). After Jennie got off the phone, defendant told her he wanted to be her boyfriend (T. 
286). Jennie told him she did not think he should be there right then (T. 286). Defendant 
felt hurt and confused because he "poured out [his] heart to her by giving her. . . support. 
. . and by showing her that somebody did care" (T. 286). Defendant was in a "state of not 
understanding" why "she would even be disrespectful to [him] in that manner, just tell[ing 
him] to leave like that" (T. 286,324). Defendant left, hoping "that [he] wasn't being used 
by her in any way" (T. 287). At that point, "it hit me that she had some problems with 
something" (T. 287). 
On cross-examination, defendant acknowledged that, contrary to his direct testimony, 
he told Sergeant Chambers that he removed Jennie's shirt and bra, and that while making out 
Jennie said she wanted to go home, and later, that she was a virgin (T. 317-18, 321-22). 
Defendant described the extent of his penetration and that he achieved orgasm within five 
or six thrusts (T. 321). He denied being aware that Jennie bled following the attack (T. 322). 
Defendant admitted that he did not strongly believe in a prohibition against premarital sex, 
but declined to straightforwardly acknowledge that his actions were contrary to the tenets of 
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the L.D.S. Church (T. 323-24). Although Jennie told defendant she was a virgin, and he 
professed a willingness to be her friend, defendant never asked her what position would be 
most comfortable for her to have sex for the first time (T. 326-27). 
In rebuttal, Jennie testified that she never said or did anything that could be interpreted 
as permission to fondle her breasts, to remove any of her clothes, or to engage in sex (T. 335-
36). When asked why she did not resist defendant more vigorously, Jennie answered that 
defendant was bigger than she was and he was pressing against her, and that she feared he 
would "hit me, hurt me and leave me there" (T. 338-39). All could she could think of was 
how to get home (T. 338). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I - By failing to specifically object at trial to jurors alleged on appeal to be biased 
and, thereafter, passing the panel for cause, defendant waived both his claims on appeal that 
the trial court erred in denying his motion for a change of venue and that it erred in failing 
to excuse the jurors for cause. Therefore, the Court is precluded from considering his claims 
on the merits. In any case, because the trial court scrupulously examined every juror whose 
responses inferred potential bias and dismissed those challengeable for cause, and because 
defendant has failed to show that any panel members were biased, this Court may feel 
confident that defendant was tried by a fair and impartial jury. 
POINT II - The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the prosecutor to cross 
examine defendant under rule 608(b), Utah Rules of Evidence as to his prior misconduct. 
Defendant's arrests for forgery, giving false information to a police officer, making a false 
report, and destroying evidence were undisputedly supported by the record, not remote in 
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time, bore directly on his lack of general credibility, crucial in a case in which credibility was 
a paramount issue, and, because only minimally referenced, not likely to inflame the jury. 
POINT III - The trial court correctly instructed the jury that the victim's lack of consent 
could be proven by defendant's "enticement" of his seventeen-year-old victim. The evidence 
amply showed that defendant aggressively pursued the victim and manipulated her into 
believing that it was safe for her to be alone with him in a remote place by playing on their 
common religious affiliation and his acquaintance with her family. Once alone, he took 
advantage of her. Any error was harmless because if the jury had convicted defendant of 
rape on the enticement theory, it would necessarily have also convicted him of forcible 
sexual, which it did not. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I - BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED TO SPECIFICALLY OBJECT AND 
THEREAFTER PASSED THE PANEL FOR CAUSE, THE COURT SHOULD 
DECLINE TO CONSIDER HIS CLAIMS THAT THE JURY WAS BIASED AND HE 
WAS ENTITLED TO A CHANGE OF VENUE ifypff 
Defendant claims that the jury was biased because it included four individuals who 
had significant connections to prosecution witnesses and the victim's family and who should, 
therefore, have been excused for cause. Aplt. Br. at 27-32. He also claims that the trial court 
abused its discretion in refusing to grant his motion for a change of venue. Aplt. Br. at 33. 
Specifically, he argues that the trial court improperly determined his motion based on 
whether the jury panel exhibited actual bias, rather than by applying State v. James, 767 P.2d 
549 (Utah 1989), and concluding that the prominence of the victim's family in the small town 
of Beaver precluded a fair trial. Aplt. Br. at 33-37. However, because defendant failed to 
challenge the four allegedly biased jurors for cause and subsequently passed the entire panel 
16 
for cause, and has not argued either exceptional circumstances or plain error on appeal, 
defendant failed to satisfy the fundamental test, that he was tried by an impartial jury. 
Therefore, the Court should not consider the merits of defendant' claims on appeal. 
A. Factual Background. 
Six days before trial, defendant filed a motion for a change of venue (R. 208-212). 
The motion alleged that defendant could not receive a fair trial in Beaver county because 
Jennie came from a prominent, well-regarded Beaver County family (T. 212).6 At a pretrial 
conference the day before trial began, the parties briefly discussed the motion, but stipulated 
that the trial court take the matter under advisement until jury selection (R. 213-14). 
The following day, sixteen potential jurors were called from a venire of twenty-seven 
persons (R. 254-53; T. 7). After introducing the prosecutor, defense counsel, and defendant, 
and after naming the State's expected witnesses, the trial court asked the prospective jurors 
a series of questions designed to identify those who should be removed for cause (T. 13).7 
6
 Defendant also argued that potential bias in the community might stem from 
inaccurate rumors that defendant had fled his first scheduled trial and that defendant, 
without the agreement of his attorney, had twice been offered a plea by local law 
enforcement officers while he was in jail (T. 212). During voir dire, defendant withdrew 
these claims as a basis for his motion (T. 56). 
7
 The court inquired into the following matters: (1) prior knowledge of the case, 
counsel, parties, and witnesses (T. 13-28); (2) close associations with those charged with 
a similar offense (T. 29-30); (3) prior experience on a jury (T. 30-32); (4) close 
associations with law enforcement (T. 32-34); (5) hardship from jury service (T. 35); (6) 
close association with Beaver County (T. 35-36); (7) close association with victim's 
parents and grandparents (T. 37, 61-75); (8) close association with the victim's mother, 
LeeAnn Carter, Beaver County Treasurer (T. 38-39); (9) jury service for prior trial (R. 
164-65; T. 39-40); (10) preference for testimony of Beaver County resident (T. 40); (11) 
relationship to other prospective jurors (T. 40); (12) resistance required to show lack of 
consent to rape (T. 75); and (13) relationship of a victim's intimacy with an accused to 
any implicit agreement to have sex (T. 75). 
17 
As the trial court removed a prospective juror for cause, it replaced that prospective juror 
with another to maintain a panel of sixteen persons (T. 15-20, 25, 61-62, 69, 76, 82, 85).8 
Following its initial round of voir dire questions, the trial court, sua sponte, removed three 
jurors for cause.0 
In chambers, after the trial court completed its voir dire, defense counsel requested 
that three additional prospective jurors be excused for cause, based on their relationships with 
Jennie's family (T. 44-46). The prosecutor and the court agreed, and the challenged 
individuals were removed (T. 44-50).l0 
Reminding the trial court that it had taken defendant's motion for a change of venue 
under advisement, defense counsel argued that he had a "general objection" to the panel (T. 
51). Relying on State v. James, counsel found "troubling" that the victim came from a 
prominent family in a small town in a small county in which her mother, the County 
8
 By this method, the resulting jury would consist of the eight members required 
by law, after each counsel had exercised his four peremptory challenges. See Utah Const, 
art. I, § 10 (mandating jury of at least eight persons in all non-capital felony trials); Utah 
R. Crim. P. 18 (a)(1) (providing for court's use of strike and replace method of jury 
selection), - (d) (allowing each side four peremptory challenges). 
9
 Those jurors were: (1) Amanda Riley (friend of the victim's mother, whose 
version of the case the juror heard from another friend and the prosecutor's neighbor) (T. 
13-14,17-18); (2) William Cox (friend of Jennie's father, from whom he heard "things" 
that embittered him) (T. 15); Gina Mayer (heard victim's mother's version of events) (T. 
19); Mickell Moreno (currently worked in same medical clinic with Dr. Melling, which 
would influence her view of the case) (T. 24-25). 
10
 The three prospective jurors removed by stipulation were: (1) Mark Nelson 
(regularly worked as a business associate with the victim's mother and knew family well) 
(T. 20-21, 45, 47-48, 76); Fred Carpenter (member of same church group and bishopric as 
Jennie and her mother) (T. 22, 38-39, 45, 48-50, 76); and Morden Gay (former neighbor 
and friend of prosecutor; fellow school teacher and teacher union associate with Jennie's 
grandmother) (T. 25-27, 38, 45, 48-49, 76). 
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Treasurer, would be testifying to Jennie's changed condition, whereas defendant was merely 
a transient worker "shoveling asphalt" (T. 51-58). 
Recognizing that the prominence of the victim's family was just one of the James 
factors and not in itself dispositive, the trial court denied the motion for change of venue (T. 
59). The court particularly noted that it had specifically questioned the prospective jurors 
so as to expose any bias in favor of Jennie or her mother stemming from their position in the 
community (T. 58). Additionally, the court based its ruling on the repeated assurances of 
impartiality it had heard in voir dire and its long experience that Beaver County juries were 
"very independent" (T. 58-60). 
Nine of the sixteen prospective jurors on the panel (after the first three were excused 
for cause) had indicated that they knew at least one of the Jennie's grandparents, Al and Ann 
Marshall (T. 37). After denying the motion for change of venue, the trial court acquiesced 
in defendant's earlier request for additional voir dire of those prospective jurors who might 
have a significantly close relationship with the Marshalls (T. 44,46-47). In open court, the 
trial court questioned each of those prospective jurors and, sua sponte, removed three more 
of them for cause based on their relationship with Jennie's family (T. 61-75).11 Thereafter, 
the court questioned the replacements of those three individuals earlier removed for cause 
11
 The additional three prospective jurors removed for cause were: (1) Wendy 
Albrecht ("fond" of Al, who had coached her husband and brothers) (T. 61); Elinor Forest 
(learned some facts of the case from a friend of Jennie's mother) (T. 62); and Tavish 
Edwards (bought hay from Al Marshall and could not be impartial) (T. 69). 
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(Gay, Nelson, and Carpenter) and, sua sponte, removed one of them (T. 82-84).l2 In all, the 
trial court excused ten prospective jurors for cause. 
A sidebar was held off the record (T. 92). Immediately afterward, the trial court 
announced that both counsel had passed the jury panel for cause and reaffirmed its denial of 
defendant's motion for change of venue (T. 92-93). After counsel exercised their peremptory 
challenges, the court read the names of the eight persons that would constitute the jury, gave 
the jury preliminary instructions on how to conduct itself, and asked for opening arguments 
(T.94-101).13 
B. A trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion 
for change of venue when it in fact impanels an impartial jury. 
Defendant relies on State v. James, 767 P.2d 549 (Utah 1989) to argue that the trial 
court abused its discretion in not changing venue. Br. Aplt. 27, 33-37. In James, the Utah 
Supreme Court reversed the trial court's refusal to change venue and set out the following 
four factors for determining when a change of venue is appropriate: '"(1) the standing of the 
victim and the accused in the community, (2) the size of the community, (3) the nature and 
gravity of the offense, and (4) the nature and extent of publicity.'" State v. Widdison, 2001 
UT 60, f 37,28 P.3d 1278 (quoting James, 767 P.2d at 552). Defendant claims the trial court 
erred in failing to consider his motion in light of the James factors, which strongly supported 
the granting of his motion. Aplt. Br. at 33-37. 
12
 The court excused Miles Barney, whose son was married to the daughter of Al 
and Ann Marshall, with whom he had a close relationship (T. 82-84). 
13
 The jury consisted of the following persons: Deborah Thompson, Pamela 
McMullin, Nella Burnette, Sheila Barton, Debbie Campbell, Deserie Bradshaw 
("Dalton/W R. 252; T. 7, 10), Lois Anderson, and Curtis Sherwood (T. 94). 
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Defendant focuses on the wrong inquiry. Unlike this case, James was an interlocutory 
appeal. It was "the unique circumstance of the interlocutory appeal [that] 'afford[ed] [the 
supreme court] the opportunity to review the denial [of the motion to change venue] before 
any error committed would be prejudicial to defendant.'" Widdison, 2001 UT 60, f 38. 
However, where, as here, a jury has already tried and convicted the defendant, the inquiry 
is not whether the trial court should have changed venue under the James factors, but 
whether the trial court in fact seated an impartial jury: "On appeal from a jury verdict, we 
do not look to the James factors to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying a change of venue. Instead we examine whether defendant was ultimately tried by 
a fair and impartial jury." Widdison, 2001 UT 60, f 38. See also State v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 
1347, 1350 (Utah 1997) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
motion to change venue absent record evidence of jury bias); State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 
1008 (Utah App. 1994) (declining to consider defendant's venue claim under James, 
concluding that the trial court's careful voir dire, followed by the defendant's passing the 
jury for cause, insured that the defendant had received a fair trial); State v. Lajferty, 749 P.2d 
1239,1250 (Utah 1988) ("The ultimate test of whether a failure to change venue constitutes 
an abuse of discretion is whether the defendant was tried by a fair and impartial jury."), 
habeas relief granted on other grounds, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991). 
Contrary to defendant's claim and in prescient accord with Widdison, the trial court 
properly refused to analyze defendant's motion for change of venue because it had carefully 
voir dired the panel for actual bias and determined, without objection from defendant, that 
the panel would act fairly and impartially (T. 58-92). 
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Both the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution guarantee the right to 
trial by an impartial jury. See U.S. Const, amend. VI; Utah Const, art. I, § 12; see also Utah 
R. Crim. P. 29(e) (detailing procedure for change of venue). However, an appellate court 
will review a claim of error only if it is preserved in the trial court or the defendant argues 
plain error, exceptional circumstances, or ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. State 
v. Hansen, 2002 UT 114, f 21, f 21 n.2,61 P.3d 1062 (declining to review the unpreserved 
challenge on appeal where neither plain error nor exceptional circumstances were alleged) 
(citing State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 P.3d 346). As this Court observed, the 
preservation rule equally applies to for-cause challenges to a prospective juror: "It is well-
settled that in order to preserve for appellate review a 'for cause' challenge to a prospective 
juror, counsel must contemporaneously state the reason for the challenge in distinct and 
specific terms." State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217,1223 (Utah App. 1993). 
The record clearly shows that defendant failed to challenge jurors McMullin, Dalton, 
Sherwood, and Burnette for cause. Indeed, defendant invited any error by affirmatively 
passing the jury panel for cause and now, on appeal, claiming that the trial court committed 
reversible error by not removing those jurors. See State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1205 
(Utah App. 1991) ("The doctrine of invited error "prohibits a party from setting up an error 
at trial and then complaining of it on appeal/") (quoting State v. Henderson, 792 P.2d 514, 
516 (Wash. 1990)); accord State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993). The record 
shows that following its initial round of voir dire questions, the trial court, sua sponte, 
removed three jurors for cause (T. 13-19, 24-25). Thereafter, at defense counsel's request 
and based on additional voir dire designed to explore prospective jurors' relationships with 
the victim's family, the court removed seven more prospective jurors for cause (T. 44-50,61 -
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62,69,76, 82-84). Defendant never challenged any of the four allegedly biased jurors at the 
close of the trial court's voir dire. Further, at that point, the panel consisted of sixteen 
prospective jurors whose backgrounds the trial court had fully explored. Following an off-
the-record sidebar, the trial court announced that "fbjoth counsel having passed the jury 
panel for cause, they will now exercise what are called peremptory challenges" (T. 92-93) 
(emphasis added). 
Because defense counsel not only failed to challenge the allegedly biased prospective 
jurors, but also affirmatively passed the jury panel for cause, well-established precedent 
precludes this Court from considering defendant's claim on appeal.14 
14
 The State anticipates that defendant might claim that his challenges to jurors 
McMullin, Dalton, Sherwood, and Burnette were preserved by the following remarks of 
counsel, delivered after the trial court's announcement that both counsel had passed the 
jury for cause: 
I don't know how well I articulated this when we were in chambers, 
because it was in the context of the discussion about [sic] motion for change 
of venue, now denied. But it was my intention, I hope I made it clear, that I 
was also stating an objection to the panel as a whole on the basis of implied 
bias, which my recollection is you also denied. 
(T. 100). The trial court acknowledged that counsel's recollection was correct and 
expressed appreciation for the clarification (T. 100). 
That statement, however, did not preserve any challenges to jurors McMullin, 
Dalton, Sherwood, and Burnette would be specious. First, the referenced in-chambers 
discussion occurred immediately after the trial court had completed its initial voir dire (T. 
42-60). At that point, jurors Burnette and Sherwood were not even on the sixteen-
member jury panel that the trial court was then questioning, but only took their positions 
on the panel when prospective jurors Gay and Carpenter were subsequently excused for 
cause (T. 76, 82). Thus, defense counsel's non-specific challenge to "the panel as a 
whole" could not have related to jurors Burnette and Sherwood. See State v. Wach, 2001 
UT 35, ffi[ 39-41, 24 PJd 948 (concluding that to preserve juror bias for appeal, a party 
must also object to subsequently summoned jurors who may be biased). Second, 
defendant's in-chambers "objection to the panel as a whole" was demonstrably not 
directed to jurors Dalton and McMullin. Although prospective jurors Dalton and 
McMullin were on the panel when defendant made his in-chambers "general objection," 
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C. In any event, this Court should feel confident 
that defendant was tried by an impartial jury. 
Recognizing the Court's concern that any possibility exists that a criminal defendant 
might have been tried by an impartial jury, notwithstanding defendant's clear waiver of his 
claim that four jurors were impartial, a brief review shows that the jury in this case was 
properly seated. 
Failure to adequately brief his claim of error - "It is well established that a reviewing 
court will not address arguments that are not adequately briefed." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 
299, 304 (Utah 1998) (citing State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) (declining 
to rule on issue where defendant's brief "wholly lacked legal analysis and authority to support 
his argument")). Defendant's argument, thrice repeated, consists almost exclusively of a 
single sentence for each of the allegedly biased jurors.15 Defendant has failed to cite any 
at that point, defendant specifically challenged only prospective jurors Nelson, Carpenter, 
and Gay, all of whom the court excused (T. 21-24, 44-45, 48-50, 76). See Gray, 851 P.2d 
at 1223 (requiring "for cause" challenge be timely and specific). 
In sum, defendant's "[general] objection to the panel as a whole" was 
insufficiently clear and specific to preserve both his challenges to the trial court's denial 
of his motion for change of venue and to the four allegedly biased jurors, or to show that 
an impartial jury sat. 
15
 Defendant only argues, 
[j]uror McMullin was a "good friend" of Officer Chambers, had Jennie's 
grandfather as his son's coach, and work with Jennie's grandfather (T. 24, 
73). Juror Dalton was the nurse of Dr. Melling, and worked with him at the 
hospital (T. 22). Juror Sherwood had done business with Jennie's mother 
and also knew her grandfather (T. 89-90). Juror Burnette was close friends 
with Officer Chambers, and was once hired by the prosecutor, but ended up 
not taking the job (T. 79). Aplt. Br. at 28 n.6, 30, 32 n.7. 
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authority discussing the relevant standards or case comparisons which would assist this Court 
in evaluating whether the juror-to- witness/party relationships in this case resulted in actual 
bias. See State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994) ("To prevail on a claim of error 
based on the failure to remove a juror for cause, a defendant must demonstrate prejudice, 
viz., show that a member of the jury was partial or incompetent."). 
Failure to marshal evidence in support of trial court's findings - Defendant has 
failed to marshal any portion of the trial court's voir dire that tended to rehabilitate the 
allegedly biased jurors. In fact, the trial explored and adequately dispelled any inference of 
bias with respect to each of the four allegedly biased jurors.16 
16
 With respect to each of the jurors, the court established the following facts: 
• Desiree Dalton - After learning that Ms. Dalton worked for Dr. Melling, the trial 
court asked four followup questions to further determine her relationship to the witness, 
the effect of that relationship on her assessment of the evidence, and whether, in spite of 
that relationship she could act fairly and impartially. Ms. Dalton consistently responded 
that she could act impartially and her relationship would not affect her view of his 
testimony (T. 21-22); 
• Curtis Sherwood - The court determined that Mr. Sherwood "knew" the victim's 
grandfather, Al Marshall, former Beaver High School football coach, only from having 
played against Beaver high when he attended Milford High School, and that he did not 
maintain a relationship with the Marshalls (T. 89-90). Additionally, he had done business 
with Jennie's mother, Lee Ann Carter, Beaver County Treasurer, "over the desk a couple 
of times, but that's all" (T. 90). He had no other relationship with her (T. 90). In 
response to the trial court's questions, Mr. Sherwood stated that neither his "knowledge" 
of Mr. Marshall nor the fact that Jennie was Ms. Carter's daughter would influence his 
views of the case one way or the other (T. 89-90). The court further established that Mr. 
Sherwood would not automatically favor the testimony of a Beaver County resident over 
someone from outside or new to the county (T. 90); 
• Pamela McMullin - Ms. McMullin acknowledged that she was a good friend of 
Sergeant Chambers and that she had met him socially, but not as often as she used to (T. 
24). When Ms. McMullin affirmed she could be a fair juror in spite of that relationship, 
25 
Witnesses known to jurors were not especially significant - All of the prospective 
juror's relationships were to relatively insignificant witnesses whose credibility was not even 
at issue. See Lacey, 665 P.2d at 1312 (finding any possible prejudice in leaving two 
witnesses acquainted with juror substantially mitigated because "[the witnesses] credibility 
was not questioned and their testimony was not crucial to the prosecution's case); State v. 
Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 177 (Utah App. 1992) (voir dire process as a whole successfully 
rebutted inference of bias of juror whose son, a highway patrolman, was a friend to two 
prosecutions witnesses testifying to chain of custody of physical evidence). Cf. State v. 
the court pressed her with additional questions: "You are telling me that even though you 
are his friend, you could feel you could find against him if you thought the evidence and 
the law required it? (T. 24). When Ms. McMullin answered, "I could," the court again 
asked, "Are you willing to do that?" (T. 24). Ms. McMullin answered, "Yes" (T. 24). 
Ms. McMullin also acknowledged that Mr. Marshall had been her two sons' coach 
and that he had been "real close" with one of them (T. 73). She acknowledged working 
on the Beaver County Board with Ann Marshall (T. 73). She also knew that Jennie was 
related to the Marshalls (T. 73-74). With respect to each of those relationships, Ms. 
McMullin repeatedly asserted that she would remained uninfluenced (T. 73-74). 
• Nella Burnette - In answer to the question whether she had any "close friends" 
who worked for Beaver County, Ms. Burnette responded, "Officer Chambers. He lives in 
town" (T. 79). She also acknowledged that two years earlier, she had been hired by Mr. 
Kanell, but never got the job because the vacancy did not materialize (T. 79). The court 
asked three questions to determine if her connection to the prosecutor might influence her 
views (T. 79-80). Ms. Burnette answered each negatively, indicating that she could 
remain impartial (T. 79-80). Relevant to any bias towards locals, the court also elicited 
that Ms. Burnette would not tend to accept the testimony of a Beaver County resident 
over a relative stranger to the county (T. 80). 
Additionally, Mr. Sherwood's relationships to Jennie's grandfather, Al Marshall, 
and to her mother, LeeAnn Carter, were not the kind that even give rise to a reasonable 
inference of bias. See State v. Lacey, 665 P.2d 1311,1312 (Utah 1983) (footnote omitted) 
(only "strong and deep impressions" on the part of a potential juror serve as the basis of a 
for cause removal) (citation omitted). 
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Brooks, 563 P.2d 799,802 (Utah 1977) (finding reversible error by single justice in seating 
two jurors who acknowledged close relationships, precluding their ability to act impartially, 
with two important witnesses). Dr. Melling testified that vaginal penetration had occurred 
and to the location of bruises on Jennie's right shoulder and left forearm, facts undisputed 
at trial (T. 180-81). Although he testified that his findings were consistent with Jennie's 
description of the incident, he also stated that the vaginal tear was consistent with consensual 
sex (T. 183-84). Sergeant Chambers was also not an important witness. It was apparent 
from his relatively brief testimony that he was often reading, without personal comment, 
fromhis transcribed interview with defendant, which was largely consistent with defendant's 
rendition of events at trial and which was admitted into evidence (T. 210-227, 332; State's 
Ex. 9). Thus, the various relationships of jurors Dalton, McMullin, and Bumette to Sergeant 
Chambers and Dr. Melling do not suggest any meaningful biases. 
Failure to show that peremptory strikes were expended on other biased jurors -
Defendant asserts that he could not have cured the problem of a biased jury because 
he used three of his peremptory strikes against jurors who were also challengeable for cause. 
Aplt. Br. at 28 n.6, 30,32 n.7.17 However, because defendant also failed to challenge these 
17
 Defendant asserts the use of his peremptory strikes as follows: 
Stubbs used peremptory challenges to strike prospective juror 
Hansen (R. 253), whose wife worked with Dr. Melling in his bishopric, who 
knew Jennie's grandfather and talked to him regularly, and who knew 
Jennie's mother but did not know her as well (T. 63-64, 66-67); to strike 
Cress Sero Lorenzo, who used to work with the Beaver County Sheriffs 
Department eight year before the trial, and who knew Deputy Chambers (T. 
87-88); and to strike Jodi Lynn Kesler, who knew Jennie's grandparents 




jurors for cause, he cannot now claim that peremptory challenges expended on those jurors 
were unavailable to strike the four allegedly biased jurors. See Wach, 2001, UT App 35, at 
1fl[ 37-40 (concluding that "failure to make any objection whatsoever" to prospective jurors 
the defendant removed with peremptory strikes waived claim that the defendant was 
prejudicially precluded from striking allegedly biased jurors); State v. Baker, 935 P.2d 503, 
510 (Utah 1997) (adopting the cure-or-waive rule and holding "that in order to preserve the 
error on appeal, a criminal defendant must exercise a peremptory challenge, if one is 
available, against the juror unsuccessfully challenged for cause"). 
In sum, the record shows that an impartial jury was seated. 
POINT II - THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR MISCONDUCT TO 
IMPEACH HIS GENERAL CREDIBILITY; ANY ERROR WAS HARMLESS IN 
LIGHT OF COMPELLING EVIDENCE OF GUILT 
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the 
prosecutor to briefly cross-examine him as to four specific instances of conduct to prove 
his untruthfulness under rule 608, Utah Rules of Evidence. Aplt. Br. at 37-45. 
Defendant's claim is rebutted by relevant Utah case law. 
A. Factual background. 
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude defendant's prior bad 
acts under rules 404(b) and 403, Utah Rules of Evidence (R. 72-73, 82-88). At the May 
1, 2001 motion hearing, the prosecutor indicated that he intended to present evidence that 
defendant had been convicted of a felony (T. 5/1:7-8). While not explicit, the parties 
plainly discussed the admissibility of the prospective evidence under rule 609, Utah Rules 
of Evidence, before agreeing to defer the question of admissibility until trial (T. 5/1: 8-9, 
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57-60). The prosecutor subpoenaed records pertaining to four arrests, i.e., forgery, giving 
false information to a police officer, making a false report, and destroying evidence (R. 
158, 161). 
On the first day of trial, the prosecutor filed a trial memorandum, requesting leave 
to cross-examine defendant about the arrests to challenge his general credibility under 
rule 608(b) (R. 230-34). An addendum attached to the memorandum, consisting of police 
and security reports and a Utah Criminal History Record, outlined the incidents:18 
1 - Forgery. On July 6, 1994, defendant was detained by employees of a Harmons 
store in St. George, Utah following a second attempt to cash a check (R. 222). The check 
was made to a "John Taylor," for $332.12 from a St. George construction company (R. 
222). Defendant claimed Taylor owed him money and had instructed him to cash his pay 
check (R. 221). Defendant claimed he picked up the check at Taylor's home, retrieved 
Taylor's Social Security card, signed Taylor's name (incorrectly), and took it to Harmons 
(R. 222). When Harmons refused to cash the check, defendant returned a few days later 
with his brother, Chris, who represented that he was John Taylor (R. 221). When Chris 
misspelled Taylor's last name, Harmons' employees called the police (R. 221). Taylor's 
roommate, Tony Fisher confirmed that Taylor intended to give defendant the check, but 
his story also suggested that defendant had misrepresented himself as "Tony Fisher" in 
picking up the check from the construction company (R. 221). Defendant and his brother, 
Chris, were arrested and booked into jail for forgery, but the case was not prosecuted (R. 
217,221). 
The addendum outlining defendant's arrests is attached at Addendum C. 
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2 - Giving false information to a police officer. On March 18, 1995, St. George 
police officers stopped to check defendant and others sitting in a parked pickup truck (R. 
228). One officer immediately smelled alcohol on defendant, who stated that he was 
twenty-one (R. 228). Later, after taking a field intoxilyzer test, defendant acknowledged 
to another officer that he was only twenty (R. 227). Defendant was arrested and charged 
with open container and giving false information to a police officer (R. 217). The charges 
were dismissed (R. 217). 
3 - Making a false report and destroying evidence. On January 22, 1999, 
defendant was charged in Kanab for interfering with arrest, destroying evidence, assault 
on a police officer, making a false report, escape, and driving under the influence (R. 
215). Defendant pleaded guilty to driving under the influence and interfering with arrest 
(R. 215). All the other charges were dismissed (R. 215). 
Following defendant's direct examination on the second day of trial, the prosecutor 
requested leave to ask defendant about each incident referred to in the trial memorandum 
(T. 288-89). After hearing argument from both sides, the trial court ruled that rule 608 
clearly allowed cross-examination of specific instances of conduct that went to the 
witness's truthfulness or untruthfulness; however, extrinsic evidence was inadmissible to 
prove or disprove the conduct (T. 298). The court granted the prosecution's request to 
cross examine defendant about each of the four incidents because they went to his 
character for untruthfulness (T. 298). However, the court specifically limited the 
questioning: "The prosecutor can ask about them. The defendant will respond. And 
whatever he says about them, the prosecutor's stuck with it. And so is the defense" (R. 
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298). The court also denied the prosecution's original request to question defendant about 
a felony conviction because it did not involve a crime of dishonesty (R. 298-99). 
Shortly after beginning his cross-examination, the prosecutor engaged defendant in 
the following exchange: 
Q: Do you recall on March 18th, 1995 being questioned by a St. George 
peace officer when he was discussing with you underage drinking, and you 
claim [sic] to that officer that you were 21 years of age when in fact you 
were only 20? 
A: I don't recall anything like that. 
Q: Do you remember on July 6, 1994, when you accompanied a person to 
the Harmon's grocery store and attempted to have that person cash a check, 
and that you later admitted to law enforcement that you had actually 
endorsed the name of the other person on the check? 
A: No. 
Q: You don't know anything about that? 
A: No. 
Q: Do you remember on January 22nd 1999, giving a false report to a police 
officer in Kanab, Utah? 
A: I don't recall anything in that manner. 
Q: Do you remember on that same date that you also destroyed evidence in 
an attempt to evade a police investigation that was being conducted? 
A: I don't. No 
(T. 300-01). 
B. Evidence of defendant's prior misconduct was admissible 
as to impeach his general credibility because it was not 
substantially more prejudicial than probative. 
Rule 608(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, "is pertinent only to specific instances of 
conduct offered as an attack on the general credibility of a witness." State v. Hackford, 737 
P.2d 200, 203 (Utah 1987). The rule specifically provides that the decision to admit 
evidence under the rule is within the discretion of the trial court: 
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of 
attacking or supporting the witness* credibility, other than conviction of a 
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crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. 
They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness 
or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) 
concerning the witness1 "character for truthfulness or untruthfulness[.] 
[emphasis added.] 
Utah R. Evid. 608(b). 
Defendant relies on State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 120, 63 P.2d 72, for the standards by 
which a trial court should evaluate a request for impeachment by specific instances of 
untruthfulness under rule 608(b). Aplt. Br. at 42-43. Gomez first outlined the general 
balancing scheme of the required analysis, recognizing the interplay of rules 608(b) and 403, 
Utah Rules of evidence: 
The trial court must (1) evaluate and consider the probative value of the 
proffered testimony, that is, the extent to which the proposed testimony is 
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, (2) determine the degree to which 
the proffered testimony may tend to inflame or prejudice the jury, and (3) 
balance the first two concerns to determine whether the danger of unfair 
prejudice substantially outweighs the testimony's probative value. [Emphasis 
added.] 
Id. at H 34. 
The court also identified several factors useful to evaluating the probative value of the 
proffered evidence: 
[T]he relative importance of the credibility of the witness, the extent to which 
the evidence is probative of other relevant matters, the extent to which the 
circumstances surrounding the specific instances of conduct are similar to the 
circumstances surrounding the giving of the witness's testimony, the 
remoteness in time of the specific instances to trial, and the likelihood that the 
alleged specific instances of conduct in fact occurred. 
Id. at % 35 (citing State v. Hall, 946 P.2d 712, 722 (Utah App. 1997)). 
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In Gomez, the defendant, on trial for rape, sought to introduce evidence of the victim's 
"alleged" use of a false identification card to gain entry into bars so that she, although 
underage, could drink alcohol. Id. at f 7. The court prohibited the evidence, holding that the 
victim's "alleged" use of a false identification card "was only slightly probative of her 
truthfulness and that the evidence would tend to inflame the jury against [the victim] because 
of the great concern in Utah over underage drinking." Id. On appeal, the Utah Supreme 
Court found that the trial court had not abused its discretion because it reasonably balanced 
the limited probativeness of the evidence against its substantial capacity to inflame the jury 
and distract it from truly evaluating the victim's credibility. Id. at f 36. 
In arguing that this Court should balance the relevant factors to yield the same 
outcome in this case, defendant both misapprehends the standard of review and the genuine 
factual distinctions in this case. First, the abuse of discretion standard is broad. In upholding 
the ruling below, the Gomez court stated that reversal would be appropriate only if "'it is 
manifest that the trial court so abused its discretion that there is a likelihood that injustice 
resulted.'" Id. at f 36. The scope of that discretion is illustrated by comparing Gomez with 
Hall, the case on which Gomez relied in setting out the operational standards for evaluating 
a request for introduction of evidence under rule 608(b). Id. at fflj 33-34. See Hall, 946 P.2d 
at 722-23. 
In Hall, a rape prosecution, the State elicited on cross-examination evidence that the 
defendant had obtained a Utah driver's license and identification card using a false name. 
Id. at 722. On appeal, the defendant did not challenge the propriety of the impeachment 
under rule 608(b), but that his counsel ineffectively failed to exclude it under rule 403. Id. 
Applying substantially the same factors to a rule 403 analysis, which Gomez later borrowed 
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and imported into its first prong probativeness analysis, this Court found that the trial court 
had not abused its discretion in admitting the evidence. Id. at 722-23.l9 Applying those 
factors, and with point-by-point citation to authority, the Hall court found that (1) the five-
year-old alteration of the license was not remote, (2) the lack of corroborating evidence in 
the case made the parties' credibility "very important," (3) the "defendant's use of a false 
name [was] highly probative of untruthfulness, (4) defendant's admission to using the false 
name mooted the question of whether the misconduct had occurred, and (5) the use of falsely 
procured identification was not the type of evidence likely to inflame the jury. Id. at 723. 
Weighing the evidence in light of those factors, the Court concluded that "the probative value 
of the impeachment evidence was not substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair 
prejudice or confusion of the issues." Id. 
Viewing the evidence in this case in light of the facts and analysis applied in Hall, it 
is manifest that the trial court did not so abuse its discretion that there is a likelihood that 
injustice resulted: 
Remoteness - None of the admitted misconduct was too remote for admission. The 
four arrests were variously made two (2 arrests), five, and six years before trial (R. 215,217, 
221-22,228). 
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 Regarding the test under rule 403, this Court stated: 
Courts have considered several factors in determining whether to 
exclude, under Rule 403, impeachment evidence otherwise admissible 
under Rule 608(b): remoteness of the evidence, importance of credibility, 
probative value of the evidence, likelihood that the prior misconduct 
actually occurred, and whether the evidence is inflammatory. 
Hall, 946 P.2d at 722-23 (citing 28 Charles Alan Wright & Victor James Gold, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 6118, at 94-100 (1993)). 
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Need for evidence bearing on credibility - As in Hall, the lack of corroborating 
evidence in the case made credible evidence bearing on defendant's credibility very 
important. 
Probative character of the specific instances on untruthfulness - It is beyond 
reasonable argument that forgery, giving false information to a police officer, destroying 
evidence, and making a false report reflect on the perpetrator's lack of general credibility. 
See Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence f 608[05] at 75-87 
(1994) (citing various authorities identifying forgery and false swearing among the specific 
instances of misconduct contemplated under rule 608(b)). See also United States v. 
Clemente, 640 F.2d 1069, 1082-83 (2nd Cir.) (in RICO prosecution, district court did not 
abuse its discretion in permitting prosecution's cross-examination into the defendant's 
destruction of personal and business records), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 820 (1981). 
Likelihood that the misconduct occurred - There is no serious argument that any of 
the arrests did not occur. All of the incidents are variously set out in official police or 
criminal history records and specifically identified by case numbers (R. 215,222,228). The 
reports referencing arrests for forgery and giving false information to a police officer are 
signed by identifiable police officers (R. 220, 225-26). The report relating to defendant's 
arrests for destroying evidence and making a false report also shows that defendant pleaded 
guilty to other charges in the same incident (R. 215). That charges relating to the specific 
instances of misconduct were dismissed or never prosecuted is immaterial to their admission 
under rule 608(b). Compare United States v. Morales-Quinones, 812 F.2d 604,613 (10th Cir. 
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1987) (recognizing that rule 608(b) reaches misconduct not resulting in conviction), with 
Gomez, 2002 UT 120, atffl[ 7,36 (approving trial court's exclusion of "alleged" misconduct). 
Tendency of Misconduct to Inflame Jury - There is no indication that defendant's 
prior instances of misconduct, significant as they were on his untruthfulness, prejudiced him. 
In accord with the well-established practice under rule 608(b), and as directed by the trial 
court, the prosecutor merely asked defendant if he recalled the arrests and then moved on 
when defendant answered negatively (T. 298,300-01). The total inquiry into the four arrests 
constituted a single page of transcript. The prosecutor did not mention the arrests in closing 
argument. 
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the prosecutor to briefly 
cross-examine defendant on prior instances of misconduct clearly reflecting defendant's 
C. The remarkable long-term turnaround in Jennie's behavior and 
personality following the rape is compelling evidence of defendant's guilt 
Even if the trial court erroneously allowed the rule 608(b) inquiry, that error was 
harmless. 
"[H]armless error is an error that is sufficiently inconsequential that there is no 
reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome of the proceedings." State v. Evans, 2001 
UT 22, U 20, 20 P.3d 888. "Put differently, an error is harmful only if the likelihood of a 
different outcome is sufficiently high that it undermines our confidence in the verdict." Id. 
Neither Jennie's nor defendant's testimony is sufficient to make a compelling 
harmless error argument. Nor is there physical evidence to strongly suggest that defendant 
raped Jennie, although Dr. Melling did testify that her vaginal trauma was consistent with her 
description of the incident (T. 181-84). 
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However, one large and significant piece of evidence compellingly speaks to 
defendant's guilt. Jennie's behavior changed so radically and distinctively following the 
incident that she was diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder, a condition which the 
State's expert confidently testified could not have resulted from mere guilt from consensual 
intercourse in her case (T. 237-38, 243). 
Jennie's mother testified that immediately following the incident and for six weeks 
afterward, Jennie would awake screaming and had to be sedated (T. 202-03). She observed 
her daughter make inordinate efforts to avoid contact with young men and observed her react 
with physical revulsion to the mention of defendant's name (T. 204-06). 
Scott Langford, Director of Social Services at Beaver Valley Hospital, diagnosed 
Jennie with posttraumatic stress disorder (T. 228-29,232-33). Both he and Dr. Mary Doty 
testified that posttraumatic stress disorder is a mental disorder recognized by the American 
Psychiatric Association and which defendant conceded had been "recognized for years'' (T. 
5/1:ll).20 Collectively, they asserted that the disorder arose from an actual or threatened 
injury related to a traumatic event involving fear and helplessness and which was 
characterized by nightmares, avoidance behavior, sleep difficulties, nervousness, and 
significant life changes (T. 188-89, 233-34). Rape was among those events that could 
precipitate the disorder (T. 192). 
20
 See State v. White, 880 P.2d 18, 20, n.2 (Utah App. 1994) (noting that "[t]he 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association Revised 
(DSM-III-R) is the authoritative reference cataloging what experts in the field currently 
believe to be mental illnesses"); State v. Haung, 394 S.E.2d 279, 284 (N.C. App. 1990) 
(noting that "reliability of testimony [on posttraumatic stress disorder] is also 
substantiated by the American Psychiatric Association's recognition of PTSD and its 
result from trauma such as rape and assault") (citing American Psychiatric Association, 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders § 309.89 (3d ed., rev. 1987)). 
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Jennie exhibited all of the foregoing behavioral symptoms (T. 235). Mr. Langford 
particularly noted the dramatic changes in Jennie's life: avoiding work and school, isolating 
herself from friends, retreating to her home (T. 235-36). Based on her history, she had been 
"a pretty typical [teenager]" (T. 230-32). In the words of her mother, Jennie went from being 
a "happy-go" person to a "scared little girl" (T. 203-04). At the time of trial, Jennie was still 
in therapy (T. 229). 
Based on this persuasive evidence that Jennie's rendition of the facts was truthful and 
that defendant indeed raped her, any error in allowing brief testimony as to defendant's prior 
misconduct was harmless. 
POINT HI - EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY INSTRUCTIONS 
EXPLAINING THAT THE VICTIM'S LACK OF CONSENT COULD BE PROVEN 
BY DEFENDANT'S "ENTICEMENT" OF THE VICTIM 
Defendant claims that the trial court improperly instructed the jury that an alternative 
basis for finding the victim's lack of consent was defendant's "enticement" of the victim. 
Aplt. Br. at 45-51. The facts surrounding the incident do not support defendant's claim. In 
any event, any error is harmless because the jury's acquittal of defendant on the forcible 
sexual abuse charge shows that it never relied on enticement in finding a lack of consent, but 
rather on the victim's express statements and conduct. 
A. Factual background. 
The prosecution requested jury instructions that included the defendant's "enticement" 
among the ways in which the prosecution could prove the victim's lack of consent in 
allegations of rape and forcible sexual abuse (R. 238-40,242).21 Defendant objected to these 
21
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406 (Supp. 2000), provides: 
An act of... rape [or]... forcible sexual abuse . . . is without consent of the victim under 
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instructions (T. 252, 340). The trial court allowed the instructions, ruling that if the jury 
believed the victim, evidence supported a finding that defendant enticed the victim (T. 252). 
The court gave three instructions relevant to enticement (attached at Addendum B). 
Jury instruction 15 states that lack of consent is established through the victim's expression 
by words or conduct or if the actor overcomes the victim through force or violence (R. 270). 
Additionally, it sets out the alternative lack-of-consent ground of enticement in the language 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406 (11) (Supp. 2000): 
The victim is 14 years of age or older, but younger than 18 years of age, and 
the actor is more than three years older than the victim and entices or coerces 
the victim to submit or participate, under circumstances not amounting to the 
use of physical force or violence " 
(R. 270). Jury instruction 17 defines enticement: 
The word "Entice" means to wrongfully solicit, persuade, procure, allure, 
attract, draw by blandishment, coax or seduce. To lure, induce, tempt, incite 
or persuade a person to do a thing. 
(R. 268). Jury instruction 18 states that given the statutory age discrepancies between the 
victim and the accused, "[ejnticement . . . occurs when the adult uses psychological 
manipulation to instill improper sexual desires which would not otherwise have occurred" 
any of the following circumstances: 
(1) the victim expresses lack of consent through words or conduct; 
(2) the actor overcomes the victim through the actual application of physical force 
or violence; 
(11) the victim is 14 years of age or older, but younger than 18 years of age, and 
the actor is more than three years older than the victim and entices . . . the victim 
to submit or participate, under circumstances not amounting to the force or threat 
required under Subsection (2) 
Defendant, whose birthday is October 22, 1974, was almost twenty-six years of age at the 
time of the incident, August 2, 2000 (T. 213, 254). Jennie, whose birthday is January 16, 1983, 
was seventeen at the time of incident (T. 119). 
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(R. 267). The instruction also identified five non-exclusive factors the jury might consider 
in determining enticement, borrowed from the relevant cases and discussed below (R. 267). 
Defendant does not challenge the legal accuracy of the foregoing instructions, but 
only that the evidence failed to satisfy the requirements of the law. Aplt. Br. at 48-51. 
B. Evidence was sufficient to justify the enticement instructions. 
In State v. Scieszka, 897 P.2d 1224 (Utah App. 1995), the defendant, a Bible 
instructor, insinuated himself into the home and good graces of a fourteen-year-old girl and, 
after several months of deliberate attention, sodomized her. Id. at 1225. The defendant was 
convicted of forcible sodomy on the theory that, under section 76-5-406 (11), he enticed the 
victim's sexual activity. Id. at 1226. Affirming the conviction, this Court noted that the 
purpose of the statute was to "protect[] young persons 'from sexual exploitation by older, 
more experienced persons until they reach the legal age of consent and can more maturely 
comprehend and appreciate the consequences of their sexual acts.'" Id. at 1227 (citation 
omitted). The Court also relied on State v. Peters, 796 P.2d 708, 711-12 (Utah App. 1990), 
for its determination that the defendant in Peters, a forcible sexual abuse case, "enticed" the 
adult victim, shortly after meetingher, into an abandoned house on the pretense of showing 
her some paintings. Scieszka, 897 P.2d at 1226 n.3. 
Similarly, in State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 352 (Utah App. 1995), another case in which 
a mature adult raped and sexually abused an impressionable fourteen-year-old girl, this Court 
emphasized that section 76-5-406 (11) provided "special protection" to juveniles less than 
18 from improper sexual exploitation by those at least three years older. Id. at 355. Judge 
Orme opined on the scope of subsection (11): "Defendant enticed [the victim] simply 
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because he was the instigator. Nothing more is required under the statute." Id. at 358 (Orme, 
J., concurring). Seeking to interpret the term, "entice," the Court recognized various 
definitions, including "[t]o wrongfully solicit, persuade,... coax, seduce,... lure, induce, 
tempt,... or persuade a person to do a thing." Id. at 356 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 531 
(6th ed. 1990)). That definition, the Court found, correctly expressed the statutory purpose 
to prohibit "the use of improper psychological manipulation to influence the will of another." 
Id. (emphasis in original). Whether defendant enticed the victim into sexual activity is an 
assessment based on the totality of the circumstances. Scieszka, 897 P.2d at 1227-28. 
The evidence supports that defendant, almost nine years older than his seventeen-year-
old victim, manipulatively coaxed her to go with him to an isolated spot where he raped her 
(T. 119, 213, 254).22 His approach to her was fast, aggressive, deliberate, and calculated, 
22
 Instruction No. 18 (R. 267) set out additional factors which this Court in both 
Scieszka and Gibson relied in assessing whether the defendant had enticed the victim and 
which defendant in this case relies: 
(1) the nature of the victim's participation (whether the defendant required 
the victim's active participation), (2) the duration of the defendant's acts, (3) 
the defendant's willingness to terminate his conduct at the victim's request, 
(4) the relationship between the victim and the defendant, and (5) the age of 
the victim. 
Gibson, 908 P.2d at 356 (quoting Scieszka, 897 P.2d at 1227) (quoting State v. Bishop, 
753 P.2d 439, 482 (Utah 1988). See Aplt. Br. at 49-50. 
These factors, which focus on the characteristics of the victim and the relationship 
of the victim to the defendant, are not particularly applicable to this case. Gibson and 
Scieszka used these factors to assess "enticement" by considering the mind set of the 
fourteen-year-old female victims in those cases. The factors were taken from Bishop, 
which used them to consider whether the defendant took "indecent liberties" with one of 
his victims, a thirteen-year-old boy. State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d at 446, 482. The Bishop 
court noted that younger victims are more susceptible to psychological harm and are less 
likely to understand the legal and moral significance of the behavior to which they are 
subjected. Id. at 482. Therefore, the court stated, it was easy to understand why the 
characteristics of the victim and the relationship of the victim to the defendant should be 
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playing on their common religious background and a syrupy, disingenuous concern for her 
feelings when, in fact, sex was hi§ only objective. 
Defendant apparently turned his car around to create his first meeting with Jennie and 
immediately asked her name, how old she was, about her family, and whether they could visit 
her family farm (T. 120-21). She declined the invitation (T. 257). Later that evening, 
defendant approached Jennie and told her he was a member of the L.D.S. Church and that 
he was baptized when he was nine years old and then showed her is CTR ring (T. 121-22, 
126). Defendant approached Jennie again the following day and again asked her to go out 
with him or take him to see her family farm (T. 122-23). Jennie said she "didn't know" and 
"would have to see" (T. 122-23). That same night, defendant noticed Jennie in her car, 
pulled his truck next to her, blocking her way, and asked a third time if she would show him 
the family farm (T. 124,261-62). Based on defendant's appearance, his being Mormon, and 
defendant's assertions about the significance of his name and his CTR ring, Jennie felt 
"okay" about defendant and agreed to take him to see the family farm (T. 125-26,262,303). 
As they passed Jennie's grandmother's house, defendant ingratiated himself to Jennie 
with his intimate knowledge of her family. He told her that he knew and had dealt with her 
grandfather, that he could find the farm on his own, and that one of Jennie's aunts was having 
family problems and that her mother was getting a divorce because her father was physically 
abusive (T. 125-29,215,264-66,306-07). Upon reaching the farm, defendant immediately 
turned around and drove off (T. 129). When she became upset about talk of abuse, he 
considered in determining whether indecent liberties had been taken. Id. However, 
because Jennie was older and undisputedly more mature than the much younger teenage 
victims in Bishop, Scieszka, and Gibson, the "Bishop" factors are not applicable here. 
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comforted her by holding her (T. 133,269-71,313). When she cried, he held and kissed her 
(T. 270,272). He asked if she would be his girlfriend, but she did not answer (T. 134,270). 
Then, having created the appropriate mood, defendant removed Jennie's shirt and bra and 
slid her onto the back seat of his truck, handling her all over (T. 135-38). When he 
unbuckled her pants, she said, "No," and only after her repeated requests to go home did he 
yield (T. 137-39). But almost immediately, defendant forcefully grabbed Jennie, pinned her 
stomach to the rear seat, and had sex with her from the rear (T. 139-41). Then he walked 
away, announcing that "he was done" (T. 140). 
These facts clearly support the trial court's decision to give the enticement 
instructions. However, any error was harmless. Had the jury really applied the prosecution's 
"enticement" theory in convicting defendant of rape, it would necessarily have convicted him 
of forcible sexual abuse. It did not. Rather, the verdict shows that notwithstanding 
defendant's enticement, the jury relied only on Jennie's reluctant conduct and explicit request 
that defendant cease his advances. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
-A 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ;*> day of June, 2003. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
76-5-402. Rape. 
( D A person commits rape when the actor has sexual intercourse with 
another person without the victim's consent. 
(2) This section applies whether or not the actor is married to the victim. 
(3) Rape is a felony of the first degree. 
76-5-406. Sexual offenses against the victim without con-
sent of victim — Circumstances. 
An act of sexual intercourse, rape, attempted rape, rape of a child, attempted 
rape of a child, object rape, attempted object rape, object rape of a child, 
attempted object rape of a child, sodomy, attempted sodomy, forcible sodomy, 
attempted forcible sodomy, sodomy upon a child, attempted sodomy upon a 
child, forcible sexual abuse, attempted forcible sexual abuse, sexual abuse of a 
child, attempted sexual abuse of a child, aggravated sexual abuse of a child, 
attempted aggravated sexual abuse of a child, or simple sexual abuse is 
without consent of the victim under any of the following circumstances: 
(1) the victim expresses lack of consent through words or conduct; 
(2) the actor overcomes the victim through the actual application of 
physical force or violence; 
(3) the actor is able to overcome the victim through concealment or by 
the element of surprise; 
(4) (a) (i) the actor coerces the victim to submit by threatening to 
retaliate in the immediate future against the victim or any other 
person, and the victim perceives at the time that the actor has the 
ability to execute this threat; or 
(ii) the actor coerces the victim to submit by threatening to 
retaliate in the future against the victim or any other person, and 
the victim believes at the time that the actor has the ability to 
execute this threat; 
(b) as used in this Subsection (4) "to retaliate" includes but is not 
limited to threats of physical force, kidnaping, or extortion; 
(5) the victim has not consented and the actor knows the victim is 
unconscious, unaware that the act is occurring, or physically unable to 
resist; 
(6) the actor knows that as a result of mental disease or defect, the 
victim is at the time of the act incapable either of appraising the nature of 
the act or of resisting it; 
(7) the actor knows that the victim submits or participates because the 
victim erroneously believes that the actor is the victim's spouse; 
(8) the actor intentionally impaired the power of the victim to appraise 
or control his or her conduct by administering any substance without the 
victim's knowledge; 
(9) the victim is younger than 14 years of age; 
(10) the victim is younger than 18 years of age and at the time of the 
offense the actor was the victim's parent, stepparent, adoptive parent, or 
legal guardian or occupied a position of special trust in relation to the 
victim as defined in Subsection 76-5-404.l(3)(h); 
(11) the victim is 14 years of age or older, but younger than 18 years of 
age, and the actor is more than three years older than the victim and 
entices or coerces the victim to submit or participate, under circumstances 
not amounting to the force or threat required under Subsection (2) or (4); 
or 
(12) the actor is a health professional or religious counselor, as those 
terms are defined in this Subsection (12\ the act is committed under the 
guise of providing professional diagnosis, counseling, or treatment, and at 
the time of the act the victim reasonably believed that the act was for 
medically or professionally appropriate diagnosis, counseling, or treat-
ment to the extent that resistance by the victim could not reasonably be 
expected to have been manifested. For purposes of this Subsection (12): 
(a) "health professional" means an individual who is licensed or 
who holds himself out to be licensed, or who otherwise provides 
professional physical or mental health services, diagnosis, treatment, 
or counseling including, but not limited to, a physician, osteopathic 
physician, nurse, dentist, physical therapist, chiropractor, mental 
health therapist, social service worker, clinical social worker, certified 
social worker, marriage and family therapist, professional counselor, 
psychiatrist, psychologist, psychiatric mental health nurse specialist, 
or substance abuse counselor; and 
(b) "religious counselor" means a minister, priest, rabbi, bishop, or 
other recognized member of the clergy. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 18. Selection of jury. 
(a) The judge shall determine the method of selecting the jury and notify the 
parties at a pretrial conference or otherwise prior to trial. The following 
procedures for selection are not exclusive. 
(a)(1) Strike and replace method. The court shall summon the number of the 
jurors that are to try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow for 
any alternates, for all peremptory challenges permitted, and for all challenges 
for cause granted. At the direction of the judge, the clerk shall call jurors in 
random order. The judge may hear and determine challenges for cause during 
the course of questioning or at the end thereof The judge may and, at the 
request of any party, shall hear and determine challenges for cause outside the 
hearing of the jurors. After each challenge for cause sustained, another juror 
shall be called to fill the vacancy, and any such new juror may be challenged for 
cause. When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk shall provide a 
list of the jurors remaining, and each side, beginning with the prosecution, 
shall indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time in regular 
turn, as the court may direct, until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or 
waived. The clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as 
shall be necessary to constitute the jury, including any alternate jurors, and 
the persons whose names are so called shall constitute the jury. If alternate 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 18 
jurors have been selected, the last jurors called shall be the alternates, unless 
otherwise ordered by th% court prior to voir dire. 
(a)(2) Struck method. The court shall summon the number of jurors that are 
to try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow for any 
alternates, for all peremptory challenges permitted and for all challenges for 
cause granted. At the direction of the judge, the clerk shall call jurors in 
random order. The judge may hear and determine challenges for cause during 
the course of questioning or at the end thereof. The judge may and, at the 
request of any party, shall hear and determine challenges for cause outside the 
hearing of the jurors. When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk 
shall provide a list of the jurors remaining, and each side, beginning with the 
prosecution, shall indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a 
time in regular turn until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. 
The clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be 
necessary to constitute the jury, including any alternate jurors, and the 
persons whose names are so called shall constitute the jury. If alternate jurors 
have been selected, the last jurors called shall be the alternates, unless 
otherwise ordered by the court prior to voir dire. 
(a)(3) In courts using lists of prospective jurors generated in random order 
by computer, the clerk may call the jurors in that random order. 
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant to conduct the examina-
tion of the prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the 
latter event, the court may permit counsel or the defendant to supplement the 
examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper, or may itself submit 
to the prospective jurors additional questions requested by counsel or the 
defendant. Prior to examining the jurors, the court may make a preliminary 
statement of the case. The court may permit the parties or their attorneys to 
make a preliminary statement of the case, and notify the parties in advance of 
trial. 
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an individual juror. 
(c)(1) The panel is a list of jurors called to serve at a particular court or for 
the trial of a particular action. A challenge to the panel is an objection made to 
all jurors summoned and may be taken by either party. 
(c)(l)(i) A challenge to the panel can be founded only on a material 
departure from the procedure prescribed with respect to the selection, draw-
ing, summoning and return of the panel. 
(cXIXii) The challenge to the panel shall be taken before the jury is sworn 
and shall be in writing or made upon the record. It shall specifically set forth 
the facts constituting the grounds of the challenge. 
(c)(lHiii) If a challenge to the panel is opposed by the adverse party, a 
hearing may be had to try any question of fact upon which the challenge is 
based. The jurors challenged, and any other persons, may be called as 
witnesses at the hearing thereon. 
(c)(l)(iv) The court shall decide the challenge. If the challenge to the panel 
is allowed, the court shall discharge the jury so far as the trial in question is 
concerned. If a challenge is denied, the court shall direct the selection of jurors 
to proceed. 
(c)(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremptory or for 
cause. A challenge to an individual juror may be made only before the jury is 
sworn to try the action, except the court may, for good cause, permit it to be 
made after the juror is sworn but before any of the evidence is presented. In 
challenges for cause the rules relating to challenges to a panel and hearings 
thereon shall apply. All challenges for cause shall be taken first by the 
prosecution and then by the defense. 
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror for which no reason 
need be given. In capital cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory 
challenges. In other felony cases each side is entitled to four peremptory 
challenges. In misdemeanor cases, each side is entitled to three peremptory 
Rule 18 UTAH RULLS OF r: ;M^'\L PROCEDURE 
challenges. If there is more than one defendant the court may allow the 
defendants additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised 
separately or jointly.
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(e) A challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and shall be 
heard and determined by the court. The juror challenged and any other person 
may be examined as a witness on the hearing of such challenge. A challenge for 
cause may be taken on one or more of the following grounds. On its own motion 
the court may remove a juror upon the same grounds. 
(e)(1) want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law; 
(e)(2) any mental or physical infirmity which renders one incapable of 
performing the duties of a juror; 
(e)(3) consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person 
alleged to be injured by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the 
prosecution was instituted; 
(e)(4) the existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other relation-
ship between the prospective juror and any party, witness or person alleged to 
have been victimized or injured by the defendant, which relationship when 
viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that the prospective 
juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would be free of 
favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be disqualified solely because the juror 
is indebted to or employed by the state or a political subdivision thereof; 
(e)(5) having been or being the party adverse to the defendant in a civil 
action, or having complained against or having been accused by the defendant 
in a criminal prosecution; 
(e)(6) having served on the grand jury which found the indictment; 
(e)(7) having served on a trial jury which has tried another person for the 
particular offense charged; 
(e)(8) having been one of a jury formally sworn to try the same charge, and 
whose verdict was set aside, or which was discharged without a verdict after 
the case was submitted to it; 
(e)(9) having served as a juror in a civil action brought against the 
defendant for the act charged as an offense; 
(eXIO) if the offense charged is punishable with death, the entertaining of 
opinions about the death penalty as would preclude the juror from voting to 
impose the death penalty following conviction or would require the juror to 
impose the death penalty following conviction regardless of the facts; 
(eXll) because the juror is or, within one year preceding, has been engaged 
or interested in carrying on any business, calling or employment, the carrying 
on of which is a violation of law, where defendant is charged with a like offense; 
(e)(12) because the juror has been a witness, either for or against the 
defendant on the preliminary examination or before the grand jury; 
(e)(13) having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to 
whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged; or 
(e)(14) conduct, responses, state of mind or other circumstances that rea-
sonably lead the court to conclude the juror is not likely to act impartially. No 
person may serve as a juror, if challenged, unless the judge is convinced the 
juror can and will act impartially and fairly. 
(0 Peremptory challenges shall be taken first by the prosecution and then 
by the defense alternately. Challenges for cause shall be completed before 
peremptory challenges are taken. 
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be impaneled. Alternate 
jurors, in the order in which they are called, shall replace jurors who, prior to 
the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become unable or disqualified 
to perform their duties. The prosecution and defense shall each have one 
additional peremptory challenge for each alternate juror to be chosen. Alter-
nate jurors shall be selected at the same time and in the same manner, shall 
have the same qualifications, shall be subject to the same examination and 
challenges, shall take the same oath and shall have the same functions. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 18 
powers, and privileges as principal jurors. Except in bifurcated proceedings, an 
alternate juror who does not replace a principal juror shall be discharged when 
the jury retires to consider its verdict. The identity of the alternate jurors may 
be withheld until the jurors begin deliberations. 
(h) When the jury is selected an oath shall be administered to the jurors, in 
substance, that they and'each of them will well and truly try the matter in 
issue between the parties, and render a true verdict according to the evidence 
and the instructions of the court. 
(Amended effective November 1, 2001.) 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Rule 608. Evidence of character and conduct of witness. 
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a witness 
may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, 
but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is 
admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been 
attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise. 
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a 
witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, 
other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by 
extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if 
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-exami-
nation of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthful-
ness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-
examined has testified. 
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does 
not operate as a waiver of the accused's or the witness' privilege against 
self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters which relate only to 
credibility. 
(c) Evidence of bias. Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be 
shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by 
evidence otherwise adduced. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Addendum B 
Addendum B 
INSTRUCTION NO. lb 
found: 
Under the law relevant to this case, lack of consent is established if any of the following is 
1. The victim expresses such lack of consent through words or conduct; or 
2. The actor overcomes the victim through application of physical force or violence; or 
3. The victim is 14 years of age or older, but younger than 18 years of age, and the actor is 
more than three years older than the victim and entices or coerces the victim to submit 
or participate, under circumstances not amounting to the use of physical force or violence 
referred to in paragraph 2 above. 
It is not necessary to show that the victim physically resisted, attempted to escape or suffered 
risk or serious wounds or injury. Moreover, a victim does not surrender the right to refuse sexual 
intimacy by accepting another's company, or by encouraging or accepting romantic overtures. 
INSTRUCTION NO. H 
The word "Entice" means to wrongfiilly solicit, persuade, procure, allure, attract, draw by 
blandishment, coax or seduce. To lure, induce, tempt, incite or persuade a person to do a thing. 
INSTRUCTION NO. / 8 
"Enticement" of a victim older than 14 years but younger than 18 years of age by an adult 
more than 3 years older than the victim occurs when the adult uses psychological manipulation to 
instill improper sexual desires which would not otherwise have occurred. 
Relevant factors which may be considered in determining enticement include: (1) the nature 
of the victim's participation (whether the defendant required the victim's active participation), (2) the 
duration of the defendant's acts, (3) the defendant's willingness to terminate his conduct at the 
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I) FELl 1 M lS l / l " , 
2) FELl J MlSl^T 
Mt/Ufc, CCfcfrtoo^ J 59'Q DcG&v 3<yy <&-
?t//(L ttsfac 1 lb-1-(ol-
l*> FELt I M l S l U ^ , 
XMVh' & e£ 
i?<rtv» j£t & 
COMMENTS, 
(J^u\ (on (+'.WUL '.* Lkkclf 
.!. Qor&Sot-> 
MEDICAL 
INJURIES, YESI 1 NOf^-f-COMMENTS, 
MEDICAL PROBLEMS, YESI I NOl^TCOHMENTS, 
HEDICATION. YESI 1 N O K 1 COMMENTS, 
NOTIFY IN EMERGENCY, 
null im»lliuM>» " ittitiui 
1,1 
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WCS^BOOKING. OFFICER SIGNATURE 
ST GEORgE^POLICE DEPARTMENT 





Forgery of Checks 
DCC. on: WED, 07-06-94 at 11:00 
or Btwn: at 
Arrestee: STUBBS, PARLEY P 
AKA: 
Age: 19 DOB: 10-22-74 ADULT 
Race: W Eth. N Hair: BLN Ht: 603 
Sex: M Eyes: BLU Wt: 105 
HP* 801 877-1119 
SS# 530-98-0797 
DL# 
,J UP* 801 877-112 Hoid for: 




Adult at interview: 
Detention appr. by: 










Loc. of Arrest 
Loc. of Crime HARMONS 
HARMONS 50 S 900 
-ARRESTED-
...... .... E Date: 07-06-94 
Means: C SHI G SOME ONE ELSES Time: 11:00 
^ Motive: PERS GAIN . . 
Distinguishing Characteristics: 
Clothing Worn: 
. Qriving (direction): 
Driving (at or between): 
Connecting Reports, People etc.: 




2 Arres t 
ADDITIONAL PEOPLE INVOLVED 














STUBBS, CHRISTOPHER JOHN 
6840 E APPLE VALLEY 
HURRICANE.UT 
THORNTON, JOHN TAYLOR 
1660 W SUNSET 
ST.GEO,UT 
FISCHER. RICHARD ANTHONY 














M Race: W 
801 877-1119 
M Race: W 
Yes 
04-06-72 



















The Details are as follows: 
I WAS CALLED TO HARMONS TO TAKE A FORGERY CASE ON A PCRS'ON TRING TO PASS 
SOME ONE ELSES CHECK. HARMONS HAD TWO PEOPLE IN CUSTODY. THE MANAGER KEN, 
TOLD ME THAT THE TWO PEOPLE HE HAD WERE TRYING TO GET HARMONS TO CASH A 
CHECK. THE CHECK IS FROM ROGERS CONSTRUCTION CO. , B.O.BOX 10, ST.GEORGE,UT. 
673-1120. IT WAS MADE OUT TO JOHN TAYLOR THORNTON. FOR $332.12. I READ BOTH 
OF THE SUBJECTS THEIR RIGHTS AND SPOKE TO THEM ALONE. PARLEY TOLD ME THAT HE 
HAD SOLD JOHN SOME TIRES BUT HAD NOT BEEN PAID. JOHN HAS NOW GONE TO MEXICO. 
PARLEY ANO A FRIEND WENT TO MEXICO TO GET JOHN'S TRUCK AND BRING IT 8ACK 
BECAUSE PARLEY'S FRIEND HAD CO-SIGNED ON THE TRUCK AND JON HAD STOPPED 
Rights (if applicable) read by: Ptt 
•ervisor 
AMlflBIO to: ¥% ASSlt. 





Rep. Off. Signature 
Div/Cik To Uhoi 
Chiriid as Arr,. _jtefer to SocUl Aoescy,
 hm _Jriw Record -, .JettoA suspended, p j ^ ^ j j y LM Enf-
WL 
ST GEORGE POLICE DEPARTMENT 
Arrest Report 




AYMENTS. PARLEY SAID THAT JOHN TOLD HIM TO GO HOME AND GET HIS PAY 
OM HIS ROOMMATE AND HE COULD HAVE IT AS PART OF THE PAYMENT FOR 
E SAID TONY FISHER (ROOMMATE) GAVE HIM THE CHECK. HE ASKED TONY 
OHN'S STUFF MAS. HE WENT THROUGH JOHN'S STUFF LOOKING FOR SOME ID 
[GNATURE ON IT. WHEN HE FOUND JOHN'S SOCIAL SECURITY CARD HE TOOK 
.INT- TO HARMONS TO GET THE CHECK CASHEO. HE TOLD ME HE HAD ALL READY 
rOHN'S NAME TO THE CHECKCMISSPELLED LAST NAME}. HE TOLD HARMONS THAT 
„J*SIGNED THE CHECK OVER TO HIM AND THEN HE SIGNED IT TO CASH IT. THEY 
ENCASH IT* HE CAME BACK A COUPLE OF DAYS LATER WITH HIS BROTHER CHRIS. 
" * THEM HE WAS JOHN AND THEY COULD NOW CASH THE CHECK. HE HAD WITH 
. . SOCIAL SECURITY CARD. WHEN CHRIS MISSPELLED JOHN'S LAST NAME 
RMONS CALLED US. WE CONTACTED ROGERS CONSTRUCTION AND THEY SAID THEY HAO 
VENAJOHN'S PAYCHECK TO TONY FISHER. AT 1550 I GOT A HOLD OF TONY FISCHER, 
"STATED HE HAD NOT GOT THE CHECK YET. HE HAS NOT SEEN PARLEY SINCE 7-1-94. 
^STATED THAT PARLEY CAME OVER IN MID JUNE AND GOT SOME OF JOHN'S STUFF. k,Y SAID HE MAS TO PICK UP THE CHECK AND GIVE IT TO PARLEY, IT WAS TO BE 
^THE TIRES. PARLEY MUST HAVE WENT TO ROGERS CON. AND GOT THE CHECK. 
"LEY..AND CHRIS WERE BOTH ARRESTED AND BOOKED INTO JAIL FOR FORGERY. T,
,E GOING THROUGH PARLEY'S PROPERTY I FOUND A CA. ID CARD FOR STACY COOKE 
• JHAD BEEN ALTERED. IT WAS TAKEN AND PLACED INTO EVIDENCE ALONG WITH THE 
EO&ANO THE SOCIAL SECURITY CARD. I WAS NOT ABLE TO GET A HOLD OF TONY 
fHS»4'HOURS AFTER THE ARREST. UNKNOWN NOW IF CHARGES SHOULD STILL BE 
%a& 
1.16~JZ&!^^ 
r ±!rim-<*^^ fWMBmfam&BSSmSIS^^ . j&£4£fcjgg^ 
bsiinx «*nfcir*Z!& '^^Stft I ^ P * % g ^ ^ %#^ 
^ ^ ^ « ^ ^ ^ )£#»*
 f-V .. ;i ; . - '*•,,,. ,*|pg 
F*\«*» V,fc, 
WfflMHM & / ^ J**fr*grN. Ttir SAr/At fry^/fr. 
" - I * * * * 
^yi&fA, ' Sy fta&j fS*. JlWc fam (A fca*i*&£ 
kcONTIMJE OH SEPERATE SHEET) 
Subscribed and sworn to before me, by .ffiaW'namaa, on this data: 
ARRESTING OFFICER) 
Magistrate, Clerk* or Notary 
I ) Telephone, signature authorized. 
jfityjtof FINDINGS AMD ORDER: 
^The' court finds the AFFIDAVIT OF PROBABLE I ] The court finds the AFFIDAVIT OF PROBABLE 
JjCADSE IS' SUFFICIENT. It Is ordered the the CAUSE IS INSUFFICIENT. It is ordered that the 
Defendant be retained in custody until bail Defendant be released from custody. 
SaipVated," or upon further order of the court. * 
DATE: . TIME: 
BY: 
JUDGE OR. KAGISTRAXK [ ] SIGNED PERSONALLY" [ j TyT.gPHQMg-the officer certifies he read 
Affidavit verbatim to the vagistxate, and 
accurately recorded his, fladings and order. 
UT(2iiZ)l0<ZilZl0 RE05TR: C-JRT,JENNIFER REAS: NSKL3 
UTAH CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORD 
AUG 04 £000 17:30:14 
THIS RECORD IS PROVIDED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY, AND MAY BE USED ONLY FOR THE 
PURPOSE REQUESTED. USE OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS RECORD IS 
GOVERNED BY STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS. MISUSE OF ANY-
INFORMATION, INCLUDING RELEASE TO UNAUTHORIZED AGENCIES OR INDIVIDUALS, MAY 
BE SUBJECT TO CIVIL OR CRIMINAL PENALTIES. 
THIS RESPONSE IS BASED UPON FINGERPRINT-SUPPORTED CRIMINAL HISTORY 
INFORMATION IN THE FILES OF THE UTAH CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION BUREAU ON THIS 
DATE. SINCE THE BUREAU'S FILES ARE REVISED AS NEW INFORMATION IS RECEIVED, 
PLEASE REQUEST AN UPDATED RECORD FOR ANY SUBSEQUENT NEEDS. IF EXPLANATION 
OF ANY INFORMATION IS NEEDED, PLEASE CONTACT THE CONTRIBUTING AGENCY. 
THIS IS UTAH'S PORTION OF A MULTISTATE RECORD. ADDITIONAL CRIMINAL HISTORY 




STUBBS, PARLEY P 
CONVICTED OF A FELONY 
MULTISTATE OFFENDER 
ALIASES: 
STUBBS, PARLEY PARKER 
STUBBS, PARLEY PARKER PRATT 
STUBBS, PARLEY PARKERPRAT 
STATE IDENT. NO. 
00408711 
SEX: HEIGHT: 






185 LBS. WHITE 
EYES: 
BLUE 
DATE OF BIRTH: 
Oct 22, 1974 
OLACE BORN: 
UT 
SCARS, MARKS, TATTOOS, AMPUTATIONS: 
SC L ELB 
SSN: 
530980797 
DRIVER LIC. ST/NO. 
UT 153233718 
RESIDENCE: 
t.905 E APPLE VALLEY DR, HURRICANE, UT (Jun 21, 1999) 
664ft EAST APPLE VALLEY, HURRICANE, UT 84737 (Mar 18, 1995) 
MISCELLANEOUS COMMENTS: 
***##***•*•*•**•••##*#**#*###•#*#•##***•***»**••*###**#*****•#**********++ 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SUMMARY 
TOTAL NUMBER OF ARRESTS: 6 
DATE OF LAST ARREST: Jan 22, 1999 
*###****#****#•#####***•**##*#»****#•#•###•#**#***•###*******#*****+******** 
CRIMINAL HISTORY 
INCIDENT # 1 
~AT£ OF ARREST: Jul 0 1994 OFFENSE TRACKINu ,: 653151 
ARRESTING AGENLY: SI. bEURGE PD (UT0£701©0> 
ARREST CHARGES: 
NCIC Code: £501, FORGERY OF CHECKS, FELONY 
HbENCY OF NEXT APPEARANCE: 5TH DIST COURT-ST. GEORGE <UT0i70l5J) 
DISPOSITION/FINDING 
CHARGES DISPOSED OF: 
NCIC Code: £501, FORGERY OF CHECK 
DISPOSITION: DECLINED TO PROS 
INCIDENT ft 2 
ARREST/CHARGE 
NAME USED: STUBBS,PARLEY PARKER PRATT 
DATE OF ARREST: Jan 22, 1995 OFFENSE TRACKING fts 661754 
ARRESTING AGENCY: WASHINGTON COUNTY SHERIFF (UT0270000) 
ARRESTING AGENCY CASE ft: 6333 
ARREST LHARGES: 
NCIC Code: 5006, OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE, MISDEMEANOR 
AGENCY OF NEXT APPEARANCE: CO JUST COURT - ST. GEORGE (UT027013J) 
NCIC Code: 5311, DISORDERLY CONDUCT, MISDEMEANOR 
AGENCY OF NEXT APPEARANCE: CO JUST COURT - ST. GEORGE (UT027013J) 
NCIC Code: 5499, UPEN CONTAINER, MISDEMEANOR 
AGENCY OF NEXT APPEARANCE: CO JUST COURT - ST. GEORGE (UT027013J) 
DISPOSITION/FINDING 
CHARGES DISPOSED OF: 
AGENCY: FIFTH DISTRICT COURT-ST GE (UT027015J) 
NCIC Code: 4804, EVIDENCE-DESTROYING, FELONY - SECOND DEGREE 
STATUTE: 76-8-510 
STATUTE TEX1: TAMP W/ EVIDENCE 
CASE fti 951500713 
DISPOSITION: DISMISSED 
DISPOSITION DATE: Aug 15, 1995 
INCIDENT ft 3 
ARREST/CHARC-
DATE OF ARREST: Mar 18, 1995 OFFENSE TRACKING ft: 6721062 
ARRESTING AGENCY: ST. GEORGE PD (UT0270100) 
ARREST CHARGES: 
NCIC Code: 4803, FALSE INFORMATION TO POLICE OFFICER, MISDEMEANOR 
AGENLY OF NEXT APPEARANCE: CO JUST COURT - ST. GEORGE (UT027013J) 
NCIC Code: 5499, OPEN CONTAINER IN VEHICLE, MISDEMEANOR 
AGENCY OF NEXT APPEARANCE: CO JUST COURT - ST. GEORGE (UT027013J) 
DISPOSITI ON/FINDING 
CHARGES DISPOSED OF: 
AGENCY: CO JUST COURT - ST. GEORGE (UT027013J) 
NCIC Code: 4803, FALSE INFORMATION TO PO 
CASE ft: J-01-CR-950106 
C^ 4SE tt: J-01-CR-950106 
DISPOSITION: DISMISSED 
DISPOSITION DATE: Jun 08, 1995 
INCIDENT # 4 
ARREST/CHARGE 
DA lb OF ARREST: Aug 27, 1995 OFFENSE TRACKING #: 6845853 
ARRESTING AGENCY: ST. GEORGE PD <UT02701<ZliZ>> 
ARREST CHARGES: 
NCIC Code: 5499, DUI, MISDEMEANOR 
AGENCY OF NEXT APPEARANCE: CO JUST COURT - ST. GEORGE (UT027013J) 
DISPOSITION/FINDING 
» * » NO INFORMATION AVAILABLE * • # 
INCIDENT * 5 
ARREST/CHARGE 
NAME USED: STUBBS,PARLEY PARKER 
DATE OF ARREST: Jan 20, 1996 OFFENSE TRACKING ttt £.853170 
ARRESTING AGENCY: WASHINGTON COUNTY SHERIFF (UT0270000) 
ARRESTING AGENCY CASE #: 6333 
ARREST CHARGES: 
NCIC Code: 4899, EVADING, FELONY 
AGENCY OF NEXT APPEARANCE: 5TH DIST COURT-ST. GEORGE (UT027015J) 
NCIC Code: 5404, DUI/ALCOHOL, MISDEMEANOR 
AGENCY OF NEXT APPEARANCE: 5TH DIST COURT-ST. GEORGE <UT027<M5J> 
DISPOSITION/FINDING 
CHARGES DI5PUSED QF: 
AGENCY: FIFTH DISTRICT COURT-ST GE (UT027015J) 
NCIC Code: 4899, OBSTRUCT POLICE, FELONY - THIRD DEGREE 
STATUTE: 41-6-13.5 
STATUTE TEXT: FAIL TO STOP/RESP AT COMMAND OF POLICE 
CASE #: 961500075 
DISPOSITION: CONVICTED PLEA: GUILTY 
DISPOSITION DATE: May 29, 1996 
CONFINEMENT: 5Y FINAL: 5Y 
AGENCY: FIFTH DISTRICT COURT-ST GE <UT027015J) 
NCIC Code: 5499, TRAFFIC OFFENSE, MISDEMEANOR - B 
STATUTE: 41-6-44 
STATUTE TEXT: DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS 
CASE «: 961500075 
DISPOSITION: DISMISSED 
DISPOSITION DATE: May 29, 1996 
AGENCY: FIFTH DISTRICT COURT-ST GE (UT027015J) 
NCIC Code: 54S9, TRAFFIC OFFENSE, MISDEMEANOR - B 
STATUTE: 53-3-227 
STATUTE TEXT: DRIVE ON DENIED LICENSE 
CASE #: 961500075 
DISPOSITION: DISMISSED 
DISPOSITION DATE: May 29, 1996 
. - > ' w i r-i r* U C 
NAME USED: 3TUBBS,PARLEY PARKER 
U^L. UF ARREST: Jan £2, 1999 OFFENSE TRACKING «: 92271,25 
ARRESTING AGENCf: KANE COUNTY SHERIFF <UT0130000) 
ARREST CHARGES: 
NCIC Code: A899, INTERFERING W/ARREST 
AGENCY OF NEXT APPEARANCE: &TH DISTRICT COURT - KANAB (UT013015J) 
NCIC Code: A80A, EVIDENCE-DESTROYING, FELONY 
AGENCY OF NEXT APPEARANCE: 6TH DISTRICT COURT - KANAB <UT013015J) 
NCIC Code: 1399, ASSAULT ON PEACE OFFICER <2 COUNTS), MISDEMEANOR 
AGENCY OF NEXT APPEARANCE: feTH DISTRICT COURT - KANAB (UT013015J) 
NCIC Code: A803, MAKING FALSE REPORT, MISDEMEANOR 
AGENCY OF NEXT APPEARANCE: 6TH DISTRICT COURT - KANAB <UT013015J> 
NCIC Code: A901, ESCAPE, MISDEMEANOR 
CHAR6E MODIFIER: ATTEMPT TO COMMIT 
AGENCY OF NEXT APPEARANCE: 6TH DISTRICT COURT - KANAB (UT013015J) 
NCIC Code: 5A99, DUI, MISDEMEANOR 
AGENCY OF NEXT APPEARANCE: 6TH DISTRICT COURT - KANAB (UT013015J) 
DISPOSITION/FINDING 
CHARGES DISPOSED OF: 
AGENCY: 6TH DISTRICT COURT - KANAB (UT013015J) 
NCIC Code: 5A0A, DUI- LIQUOR- 2ND OFFENSE, MISDEMEANOR - B 
CASE *: 99161210003 
DISPOSITION: CONVICTED PLEA: GUILTY 
DISPOSITION DATE: Feb 19, 1999 
CONFINEMENT: 0-18M FINAL: 0-18M 
PROBATION: AP&P 
AGENCY: feTH DISTRICT COURT - KANAB (UT013015J) 
NCIC Code: A899, INTERFERING W/ ARREST, MISDEMEANOR - B 
CASE #t 991&00003 
DISPOSITION: CONVICTED PLEA: GUILTY 
DISPOSITION DATE: Feb 19, 1999 
COMMENTS: *ALL OTHER CHARGES DISMISSED* 
END OF RECORD 
